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La relation franco-amiricaine est, a certains egards, schizo-
phr~nique. Nous ne cessons de critiquer les Etats-Unis d'une
manikre systematique, caricaturale, parfois ridicule, mais nous
ne perdons jamais une occasion d'imiter, voire de singer, notre
plus vieil allis.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note will attempt to explain the intersection of agency costs
and bankruptcy law, looking first to general agency problems involved
when firms are insolvent and moving next to discussions of how U.S.
Chapter 11 and French bankruptcy laws attempt to address these prob-
lems. First, I will attempt to articulate the relationship between agency
costs and (1) debtor control over the firm during Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions and (2) deviations from the absolute priority rule in Chapter 11.
Specifically, I will argue that creditors voluntarily accede to plans pro-
posed by management that impair the same creditors' legal entitlements,
and that this otherwise irrational behavior is an attempt to reduce the
agency conflicts inherent in the creditor-management and creditor-
shareholder relationships of an insolvent firm.
I will then compare the U.S. Chapter 11 model of bankruptcy with
the French redressement judiciaire procedures, which banish manage-
ment and equity stakeholders in favor of a state-run rehabilitation. The
French laws address agency conflicts by assessing penalties on directors
for malfeasance, but ultimately they exacerbate the agency conflict
between management and debt and sabotage the pro-employment and
pro-rehabilitation goals of French bankruptcy. As we look to the French
system, the positive elements of Chapter 11 will become clearer, and we
will be able to reconstruct the purpose of Chapter 11-even with its abso-
lute priority deviations-as a pragmatic solution to unavoidable agency
1. Translation: "The Franco-American relationship is, in many respects, schizo-
phrenic. We never cease our systematic, caricatured, at times ridiculous critique of the United
States, but we never lose a chance to imitate-indeed, to ape-our oldest ally." Paul Giacobbi,
161st session of the Assembl6 Nationale, Mar. 1, 2005, available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/l2/cri/2004-2005/20050161.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2005) (comenting on the new
French Sauvergarde bankruptcy Law).
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problems resulting from debt. Ultimately, I will describe the recently-
created sauvegarde procedure in France-a dramatic departure from cur-
rent French bankruptcy laws-as a substantial step toward a Chapter 11
framework and a welcome development from an agency perspective.
Part II will examine the benefits of the absolute priority rule. Part III
will address the agency conflicts-and their costs-of debt in the insol-
vency and bankruptcy context. Next, in Part IV, I will explore the
empirical, doctrinal, and normative elements of absolute priority devia-
tions in Chapter 11 bankruptcies. In particular, I will examine the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in some detail, pointing out its bias in favor of man-
agement as well as the justifications for such bias. Finally, in Part V I
will similarly analyze the French civil law insolvency regime, uncover
the structural agency dilemmas, and evaluate recent proposed reforms to
the French system that make management and equity more active inter-
locutors in the discussion that will determine the firm's future.
II. THE EXANTE BENEFITS OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE
The absolute priority rule (APR) holds that prepetition contractual
entitlements will be respected in bankruptcy proceedings. Under a strict
application of the absolute priority rule, senior creditors must be fully
compensated before junior creditors receive anything. Junior creditors,
then, must be compensated the full value of their claims before anything
goes to the residual claimants, and so forth. Equity, of course, is always
paid last. The U.S. Supreme Court has quoted approvingly from a case
explaining that the APR "provides that a dissenting class of unsecured
creditors must be provided for in full before any junior class can receive
or retain any property [under a Chapter 11] plan." '2 For an insolvent firm
whose liabilities exceed its assets' value (even taking into account sal-
vaged going concern value), the absolute priority rule mandates a zero
distribution to equity holders.
When bankruptcy regimes respect the contractual arrangements of
debtors and creditors, and do not interfere with their bargained-for
entitlements, an argument may be made that the system is ex ante effi-
cient. That is, if lenders can lend freely without taking into account the
possibility that a bankruptcy court may impair their contractual rights,
they will be able to offer more favorable yields, maturities, and interest
rates to their debt, as well as require fewer restrictive covenants in their
loan agreements. The net effect of such consequences is a lower cost of
2. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988) (quoting from the
homonymous Eighth Circuit opinion, from which the appeal originated, In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d
388, 401 (8th Cir. 1986)).
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borrowing for borrowing firms and increased firm values. Conversely,
deviations from absolute priority, because they expropriate wealth from
debtholders to shareholders, have ex ante inefficiency effects and in-
crease the cost of capital and the costs of bankruptcy to corporations
Lenders will also be able to lend less money, as the resultant increased
cost of capital will inevitably price some borrowers out of the market.
Such a discussion undoubtedly simplifies the scenario, since ceteris
paribus the cost of equity should decrease in lockstep with the increased
cost of debt. Equity will pay for pawning off bankruptcy risk onto deb-
tholders in the form of higher interest rates. Absent some justification for
APR violations, however, the bankruptcy litigation/restructuring process
would amount to an expensive deadweight loss, and its effect would be
simply to transfer risk and value from one group of security-holders to
another.
Empirical investigations, however, consistently confirm what bank-
ruptcy professionals have known all along: bankruptcy courts are always
approving plans that deviate from absolute priority, usually in favor of
equity holders. Why bankruptcy courts and Chapter 11 plans tinker with
prepetition terms of debt contracts-and whether their reasons are effi-
ciency-enhancing or fair-are questions that have received ample
treatment in the literature. Commentators are far from united in their
judgment of the desirability of APR deviations, but most agree that by
awarding equity holders and management a stake in a bankrupt company,
irrespective of their prebankruptcy contractual entitlements, the bank-
ruptcy regime can reduce agency costs incident to an insolvency scenario.
Seen in this light, APR violations may be a positive economic factor, in-
asmuch as they simultaneously lower the cost of equity by granting equity
holders a stake in an insolvent company and reduce the agency costs that
debtholders must bear, thereby reducing the cost of borrowing.
3. For some representative discussions of this much-discussed phenomenon, see Mi-
chael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. App. CORP. FIN. 13
(1991); Merton H. Miller, The Wealth Transfers of Bankruptcy: Some Illustrative Examples,
41 L. & CONTEM. PROB. 39 (1977).
4. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
5. This Note is primarily concerned with the efficiency of deviating from the contrac-
tual entitlements of banks and the holders of debt securities. Both of these sets of sophisticated
economic actors, we can assume, are able to offset the likelihood of bankruptcy in the form of
higher interest rates and so forth. Accordingly, concerns of equity are inapposite for these
creditors. It is equally safe to assume, however, that less sophisticated trade creditors, as well
as involuntary creditors such as tort victims, have not taken such remedial measures, and seri-
ous concerns about the equity and fairness of deviating from absolute priority remain. Such
considerations, though certainly relevant to any policy debate on the topic of Chapter 11, are
not the concern of this Note.
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III. AGENCY COSTS OF DEBT IN THE CONTEXT
OF AN INSOLVENT FIRM
Agency costs are the incremental costs of having an agent make
claims for a principal.6 It is generally impossible for a principal to ensure
at zero cost that an agent will make optimal decisions from the princi-
pal's viewpoint. Adam Smith coined the expression that is now part of
our common understanding of the agency cost problem: in the end,
agents are dealing with "other people's money,"8 and principals must
incur costs in order to ensure their money is put to good use.
The agency problem with respect to debt centers along the perverse
incentives management and equity have to make firm decisions that ra-
tionally pursue their own interests but detract from the value of the firm
and the debt. These problems are most acute (and their concomitant
costs the highest) when a firm is highly levered and in the zone of insol-
vency. For the moment, I will assume an identity of interest between
shareholders and management. This assumption is not always safe to
make,9 but it will allow for a more direct illustration of the agency conflict.
6. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
7. See id. at 308. In their seminal article, Professors Jensen and Meckling define
agency costs as the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding
expenditures by the agent, and (3) the [resultant] "residual loss" (i.e., the loss in welfare due to
imperfect monitoring). See also Lemma W. Senbet, Comment, Protecting Stakeholder Inter-
ests in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 717, 717 (1993) ("The core difficulty
in contracting under an agency environment comes from imperfect observability of private
actions of corporate insiders, in the form of managerial effort, investment risk choices, and so
forth.").
8. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 700 (1937).
9. Management's role in the imposition of agency costs is more complex than some of
the literature has recognized. Management's interests are never in perfect harmony with eq-
uity's interests, though several important articles seem to assume that management is always
shareholder-oriented. See, e.g., Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims
in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation, 37 J. L. & ECON. 157 (1994); Lucian Ayre
Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganiza-
tion, 8 J. L. & ECON & ORG. 253 (1992). To the contrary, management's interests often shift
depending on a confluence of factors. For example, management is often overinvested in the
firm due to executive compensation schemes, whereas equityholders are usually fully diversi-
fied. See Brian L. Betker, Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power, and
Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter II Bankruptcies, 68 J. Bus. 161 (1995). The
lack of diversification can join management and creditors' interests and cause managers to be
more risk averse than owners when the firm is solvent. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk
Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 277, 291 (1991);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. R. 650,
653 (1984). Also, management's human capital is invested entirely in the insolvent firm, and
to leave in times of financial distress can be fatal to a CEO's prestige and career prospects. See
supra at 278-83. In addition, debtholders may exert a high degree of influence over incumbent
management, both as a practical and legal matter. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The
"New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003); Lynn M.
Michigan Journal of International Law
A more crucial assumption-that shareholders are fully diversified and
therefore do not bear a substantial risk should a firm liquidate-also un-
derlies this discussion and is safe to assume in the context of large
publicly held corporations.
There are several explanations for the existence of debt financing.
The trade-off theory of capital structure holds that managers maximize
firm value by taking advantage of tax shields.' ° Other theorists posit that
managers prefer debt because the expected returns are lower than the
returns on equity." Still others emphasize the debt market's role in moni-
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993) (suggesting a direct relation-
ship between depth of insolvency and degree of creditor influence over management); Stuart
C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate
Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990) (documenting dra-
matic shift in control over corporate assets and control in favor of large creditors for some
firms in financial distress); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications
Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, *108 (Allen, Ch.) (insisting that directors owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporate enterprise as a whole, including creditors); In re Xonics, Inc., 99 B.R.
870, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) ("When a corporation is insolvent its officers and directors
stand in a position of trust not only to the corporation and it shareholders, but also to its credi-
tors."). Keeping these facts in mind, it may be that rational managers care more about the
company's survival (and their continued remuneration and reputation) than the dispersion of
returns to investors. See Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 278-79; see also James D. Westphal,
Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board Independence from Man-
agement, 43 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 511, 518-19 (1998). A final concern merits attention: managers
may be deterred from mirroring equity's rational acceptance of risk and return by the possibil-
ity of ex post facto shareholder derivative suits against management. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods
Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). Despite the degree of complexity, manage-
ment's interests undeniably move closer to equity's interests as the firm approaches
insolvency, for two reasons: first, management compensation is closely tied to the value of
equity rather than firm value; and second, much as equity is willing to assume high variance
projects with low expected returns to save their investment, a desperate manager will often be
willing to do the same to salvage her reputation and job. But see LoPucki & Whitford, supra,
at 729 (finding 95% of tainted CEOs either resign or are fired from their positions).
10. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STUART C. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 497, 508-10 (2003). The trade-off theory posits that firms choose a debt-equity ratio
by maximizing tax savings and minimizing the costs of financial distress, which are discussed
infra. Crucial to the trade-off theory is the value of the tax shield that allows corporate taxpay-
ers to deduct payments on corporate debt against corporate income.
11. Id. at 511-15; see also Stewart C. Myers, Capital Structure, 15 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 2001, at 81, 91-93. This theory, known as the pecking order theory of capital structure,
emphasizes the information asymmetry between investors and managers. Investors, assuming
that managers know the company's prospects better than they do, will interpret an equity issue
as evidence the stock is overvalued and will discount the share price accordingly. Firms will
therefore prefer debt to equity when internal financing is insufficient to fund capital expendi-
tures. The pecking order theory does not explain, however, why alternative financing tactics
are not developed to remedy the information asymmetry and obviate the need to discount the
stock price for a new equity issue. For example, Myers suggests a "deferred equity" security
in the form of a bond that is converted after some period of time-when the information gap
has been bridged-into equity securities priced at the original share price but worth the bond
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toring management's actions and minimizing free cash flow that could• 12
be squandered on organizationally inefficient investments. Although
financial economists are not in agreement as to underlying reasons for
firms' issuance of debt, anyone minimally acquainted with the financial
world knows one thing: corporations issue debt all the time, and too
much of it can be a bad thing, due to financial distress costs.
13
A. Asset Substitution 4 Problem
Since equity enjoys limited liability for its investment, it stands to
lose nothing more than its original capital contribution. As a firm be-
comes more highly levered with debt, a greater share of corporate
earnings must be diverted to service the corporate debt obligations. In
such a scenario, the shareholders will prefer higher risk projects than
would the same shareholders in a less levered firm in order to increase
their own expected return. Rather than engaging a project that will earn
just enough to pay back the debt, the shareholders would prefer to gam-
ble a bit and hopefully have some cash left for dividends or re-
investment after paying the debtholders their obligations.
When a firm is insolvent, 5 the shareholders have literally nothing
(left) to lose. If an insolvent firm is liquidated, there is usually not enough
value to fully satisfy the creditors' claims; the shareholders, as residual
claimants, have no legal rights or entitlements to any of the firm's assets.
As a result, there exists a negative correlation between the amount of debt
issued and the amount of downside risk shouldered by equity.
price. Thus, the investor protects herself from downside risk: if the share price decreases dra-
matically, the equity investor will obtain more shares but the same value. See id. at 95.
12. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 9. Judge Easterbrook elaborates the disciplining
role of debt. By forcing managers to make regular payments to service a company's debt,
management has less free cash flow to squander. In this way, debt serves to minimize the
agency conflict between management and equity. Diversified shareholders cannot possibly
monitor what their managers do with company cash flows, so they require the firm to take on
debt in order to minimize the temptation for managers to expropriate firm cash flows.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. The phrase "asset substitution" owes its provenance to an important article by Clif-
ford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. FIN. EcON. 117, 118-19
(1979).
15. Insolvency is not a neatly defined description of a firm's finances. Bankruptcy
courts will utilize two alternative formulations in gauging whether a firm is insolvent. The first
is called the "balance sheet" test and the second is called the "cash flow" or "equity" test. The
"balance sheet" test utilizes a simple ratio of liabilities to the fair market value of the firm's
assets. Under the Bankruptcy Code, insolvency is defined as the sum of the debtor's liabilities
exceeding the sum of its assets "at a fair valuation." 11 U.S.C.A § 101(32) (2004). The "cash
flow" test focuses on a firm's ability to produce sufficient cash flows to pay off debts as they
come due. See generally Richard M. Cieri & Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and Offi-
cers of Corporations That Are Insolvent or in the Zone or Vicinity of Insolvency: Important
Considerations, Practical Solutions, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 295, 306-11 (2004).
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Some commentators have likened equity to a holder of a call option
on the firm's assets.'6 The shareholders, in effect, sell an unlevered firm
to the debtholders in exchange for (1) proceeds from the loan to finance
operations, (2) a management contract, and (3) an option to repurchase
the firm by paying the principal of the loan plus interest should the in-
vestment succeed. 7 As with any option, its value to the option holder
increases with the volatility of the underlying asset.18 Equity, qua option
holder, possesses a diminished investment value and little risk during
insolvency, and it will prefer to engage in high risk, high variance pro-
jects even if those projects carry lower expected returns. If the project
fails, equity is in the same state as it was ex ante (that is, zero distribu-
tion); conversely, if the project succeeds, equity pockets any value above
and beyond that to which bondholders are contractually entitled. Deb-
tholders, by contrast, stand to bear all declines in the residual value of the
firm.
As an illustration, imagine a firm with assets valued at $1 million.
The firm owes $1.2 million to creditors and is experiencing difficulty
meeting its obligations due to insufficient cash flows. The firm has a
capital structure made up of only debt and equity, and the entire amount
of the debt is due at a specified time in the near future. The firm is, by
any standard, insolvent. Imagine further that management is entrenched
and still reflects the interests of shareholders, whose equity interest is
worthless at the moment. Assume further that the firm can invest in two
mutually exclusive projects, Project 1 and Project 2. Project 1 requires
an initial investment of $100,000 and will pay out at the end of the year
$70,000 half the time and $180,000 half the time. The present value of
Project l's returns, assuming a discount rate of 10 percent, is $114,000
and therefore increases the firm's value by $14,000. Project 2 also re-
quires an initial investment of $100,000 and will pay out at the end of
the year $1 90 percent of the time and $500,000 10 percent of the time.
Project 2's net present value is -$55,000 and therefore decreases firm
value by that amount.
From the firm's standpoint, Project 1 is clearly preferable to Project
2. From the shareholders' perspective, the opposite is true. In this styl-
ized example of two mutually exclusive projects, the interests of the firm
and the firm's shareholders are in perfect antinomy. The shareholders in
this example do not have static interests and incentives. Their investment
16. For a discussion of the legal consequences of the interesting intersection of option
theory and fiduciary duties, see Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784 (1992).
17. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 245 (1993).
18. JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 168 (2003);
BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 581-82.
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risk preferences increase dramatically as the firm is levered up. In such a
world, the shareholders will eschew Project 1 and pursue Project 2, de-
spite its dramatic negative net present value and high variance. '9
Professor John Coffee is correct to analogize equity's interest in an
insolvent firm to a controlling interest in a firm whose board of direc-
tors is beholden to a constituency of warrantholders. ° Management
would, in such a scenario, be pressured to pursue excessively risky in-
vestments. When management and shareholders engage in these asset
substitution games, wealth is expropriated from the bondholders to the
shareholders and management. Such is the unenviable position of deb-
tholders (and preferred shareholders) when a firm owing obligations
approaches insolvency.
B. Other Agency Costs of Debt
Asset substitution is not the only cause for worry for creditors. For
example, managers have other incentives to delay liquidation even if an
immediate liquidation would capture more value for creditors. The abil-
ity to delay liquidation is related to the asset substitution games
discussed supra, but it has an additional component. By avoiding an effi-
cient liquidation, management and shareholders can attempt to "wait
out" the financial distress storm in hope of a favorable resolution of mac-
roeconomic conditions. 2' Thus, management may seek to hold off
liquidation in the hope that random shocks may increase the firm's
value, thereby giving them once again a stake in the enterprise.
19. A recent example is illustrative of these conflicts. In March 2005, Jetsgo, Inc.-the
third largest Canadian airline with a majority owner serving as president-filed for bankruptcy
protection in Canada. In the eight months preceding the filing, Jetsgo had lost $88 million, and
$22 million had been lost during the two months preceding the filing. The airline has adopted
a strategy that (amazingly) involved pricing fares consistently below its costs of operation. As
the airline continued losing money, it began to take on even riskier projects in the mad dash
for market share: Jetsgo offered return segments for already heavily discounted flights for a
paltry $1 Canadian. Predictably, the losses accelerated, and the company is now likely to be
liquidated. See Jetsgo Lost $55 Million in 8 Months, Court Told, CBC News, Mar. 11, 2005,
available at http://www.cbc.ca/ story/canadalnationall2005/03/l l/jetsgo-lapierre050311 .html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2005); Jetsgo Passengers Grounded, at http://gocanada.about.calcs/
airlinesl/a/jetsgoloonie.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2005). A less current, but more colorful
example, is recounted in In re Tri-State Paving, Inc., 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982). In that
case, two individuals who were the sole officers, stockholders, and directors of an insolvent
firm withdrew all the contents of the corporation's only bank account and gambled the money
away during a trip to Las Vegas. The directors made the withdrawals "for the sole and only
purpose of financing a money-spending spree and gambling adventure of the officers ... which
they must not be permitted to do at the risk of the creditors in this proceeding."
20. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 77, 103-
04 (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988).
21. See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 9, at 255; GILSON & BLACK, supra note 17, at
248.
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The longer a firm delays its entrance into a Chapter 7 proceeding,
the more value will be siphoned off in the form of "financial distress
costs." Financial distress costs are typically divided into two catego-
ries: direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include the administrative
and legal expenses of bankruptcy. In the United States especially, firms
can remain in bankruptcy for long periods of time without ever facing a
real prospect of liquidation.22 In these cases, fees and expenses do not
substantially decrease the value of the estate, but they are still notewor-
thy, with some studies estimating direct bankruptcy costs as high as 7.5
percent of total book value of assets.23
The indirect costs of financial distress are comparatively much more
injurious to overall corporate value. Indirect costs include trade credi-
tors' unwillingness to continue doing business with the debtor,
difficulties in maintaining relationships with suppliers, staff attrition,
diverted focus from competitiveness to bankruptcy, customer worries
24about warranties and lost sales, and an increased cost of capital. Indi-
rect costs are impossible to quantify precisely, but they are more
significant than the direct costs.25 The costs of financial distress (unlike
the distributive effects of asset substitution games) represent a loss to all
corporate stakeholders, and the longer a firm incurs the costs, the more
inefficient the bankruptcy is and the less value is available for stake-
holders in the end.26
22. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wisc. L. REv. 729, 739-
45.
23. See Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost
Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067 (1984). Recent studies have produced much lower figures than the
Altman study suggests. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants
of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, I J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 111
(2004) (estimating that professional fees amounted to 1.4% of the distressed debtor's total
assets at the beginning of the bankruptcy filing); Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Cor-
porate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11
Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509 (2000) (estimating the figure at 1.8% of prepetition asset
value); Brian L. Betker, The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructuring: Some Recent Evi-
dence, 26 FIN. MGMT. 56 (1997) (finding a ratio of direct costs to assets of 3.9% in 75 Chapter
11 cases). The larger the corporate bankrupt, the smaller the percentage of value that is eaten
up by legal and administrative expenses. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 465 n.107 (1992). For a current example of a costly bankruptcy, see
Marilyn Adams, Bankruptcy Lawyers, Advisers, Land Hefty Airline Deals, USA TODAY, Sep.
26, 2005, available at http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/usatoday/20050926/bs_
usatoday/bankruptcylawyersadviserslandheftyairlinedeals (last visited Sep. 29, 2005).
24. See BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 501-02; see also Lawrence A. Weiss,
Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285
(1990).
25. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2386, 2406 (2001).
26. See Frank J, Fabozzi et al., Recent Evidence in the Distribution Patterns in Chapter
11 Reorganizations, 2 J. FIXED INCOME 6 (1993).
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Other opportunities for abuse exist. Shareholders will likely pressure
management to "cash in and run" by declaring dividends before the firm
enters into bankruptcy protection.27 When shareholders capture this value
on the eve of bankruptcy, debtholders lose as the decrease in firm value
(due to the cash dividend) is shared among debtholders. Another prob-
lem plays out in reverse: when a highly levered firm needs additional
capital to pursue positive NPV projects, equity will be unwilling to con-
tribute additional equity capital because, in effect, the increase in firm
value is shared with the creditors . A final difficulty is the "bait and
switch," or claim dilution, problem. If a moderately or barely levered
firm suddenly announces its intention to lever up significantly, all the
firn's debt becomes riskier, including the former low risk debt. By ren-
dering this formerly safe debt risky, the shareholders can impose a
capital loss on the old debtholders and obtain an identical increase in the
value of equity.
29
C. Agency Costs Ultimately Borne By Shareholders
Of course, any agency costs imposed on creditors to monitor and
curtail shareholder malfeasance will ultimately be borne by the share-
holders themselves. Creditors will contract with the borrowing
corporation ex ante through such devices as bond indentures and loan
agreements containing covenants. These and other contractual arrange-
ments aim to restrict the abilities for management and shareholders to
shift uncompensated risk onto the creditors. Negotiating the covenants,
27. See BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 505.
28. Of course, the law, both bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy, has developed ways to
discourage these courses of action that harm overall firm value. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.,
Tit. 8 § 170(a) (providing that dividends must be paid either from a firm's surplus or out of the
corporation's net profits for the fiscal year in which the dividend is declared and/or the preced-
ing year); DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 8 § 174(a) (2003) (making directors liable to the corporation,
or "to its creditors in the event of dissolution or insolvency," for willful or negligent violation
of the state's statutes regarding the payment of dividends); I I U.S.C. § 548 (permitting the
bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession to avoid fraudulent transfers, which can include
excessive dividend payments). See, e.g., Pereira v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc'y of the United
States (In re Trace Int'l Holdings, Inc.), 289 B.R. 548, 557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
that an insolvent Delaware corporation cannot lawfully pay a dividend to shareholders and that
the trustee is able to recover the payment under § 548). For a related case, consider In re Im-
age Worldwide, Ltd., 139 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 1998), where a debtor guaranteed loans of an
affiliated corporation on the eve of bankruptcy and paid the loans despite creditors' objections.
The court upheld the bankruptcy judge's determination that the transfer (i.e., the guarantee)
was not for "reasonably equivalent value" and was recoverable for the benefit of the estate.
Note, however, that fraudulent transfer and preference payments are voidable at the discretion
of the party in control of the estate. Creditors do not have the authority to challenge these
payments ex post. Since most firms in Chapter I 1 are guided by old management as a debtor-
in-possession (see discussion Part IV.B. 1 infra), the agency conflicts may remain.
29. See BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 505-06.
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and monitoring ratios and "event risks" is expensive, and shareholders
can be sure to pay for these safeguards in the form of higher interest
rates .o
Much progress has been made in the drafting of bond covenants, and
much of that progress is due to insights about the options implicit in the
debt contract. Lenders, however, do not have limitless resources (or
imagination) to anticipate every possible manifestation of share-
holder/management malfeasance. Additionally, some of the conflicts that
result in agency costs, most notably the asset substitution problem, are
difficult to contract around. This difficulty is exacerbated if, as in the
United States, the bankruptcy laws allow management to remain in
charge of a bankrupt corporation under the bankruptcy courts' jurisdic-
tion.3
IV. DOES DEVIATING FROM ABSOLUTE PRIORITY TEMPER
AGENCY CONFLICTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
CHAPTER I I REORGANIZATIONS?
A. Empirical Observations
Empirical investigations confirm what bankruptcy lawyers know
through practice: bankruptcy courts 2 routinely approve Chapter 11 reor-
ganization plans that deviate from absolute priority, usually in favor of
shareholders.33 According to one study, shareholders receive, on average,
7.6 percent of total corporate value in excess of their contractual legal
30. See id. at 507.
31. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows for management to remain at the helm of a filing
company that is a "debtor-in-possession." See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2005). As a practical mat-
ter, management stays on (at least at first) in almost all cases and the appointment of a trustee
or examiner is reserved only for cases of extreme abuse. See, e.g., In re Microwave Prods. of
Am. Inc., 102 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989) ("The appointment of a trustee is the
exception rather than the rule in chapter 11 cases, and is an extraordinary remedy available to
creditors"). See also discussion infra Part IV.B. 1.
32. The courts' (and the Code's) willingness to accommodate such plans affects negotia-
tion in and out of Chapter 11. Thus, equity manages to extract value in informal workout
negotiations and pre-packaged bankruptcies ("pre-packs") as well. For a theoretical analysis of
how the availability of Chapter 11 shapes workout and pre-pack negotiations, see Eli Berkovitch
& Ronen Israel, The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations, 2 EUR. FIN. REV. 1
(1998). Some have found results consistent with lower (but still substantial) bargaining leverage
for management and equity in pre-packs and workouts than in full-blown Chapter 11 proceed-
ings. See Maria Carapeto, Is Bargaining in Chapter 11 Costly? (unpublished manuscript) (Oct. 6,
2003), available at http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/faculty/mcarapeto/papers/Bargaining.pdf (last
visited Mar. 13, 2004).
33. In addition to the articles discussed in the text, readers should consult Julian R.
Franks & Walter N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in Distressed Ex-
changes and Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 349 (1994) and Carapeto, supra
note 32.
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entitlements.34 Another study-conducted by Professors LoPucki and
Whitford-confirmed that in 21 of the 30 largest bankruptcies of insol-
vent companies in the 1980s, equity received some payout in Chapter 11,
rarely (though occasionally) amounting to 10 percent of the available
assets.35 Professor Michelle White found that equity receives at least 5
percent of the value of all creditors' claims in all bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions, with that proportion increasing as the return to creditors
increases.36 Still another study found 20 of 26 large bankruptcies deviat-
ing from absolute priority in favor of equity, and against unsecured
creditors.37 Whereas in relative terms, the divergences from APR are
small, the amounts of money at stake are substantial, reaching $63 mil-
lion in one case.38 In almost all the cases examined by Professors
LoPucki and Whitford, these costs exceeded the direct costs of bank-
ruptcy.39
A study by Professor Brian Betker examining a sample of 75 firms
filing for Chapter 11 protection between 1982 and 1990 yields the most
conservative estimate of absolute priority deviations.4 Betker's results
demonstrate a 2.86 percent mean deviation from contractual entitlements
under the absolute priority rule.' The absolute mean deviation is $5.64
million.42 The deviations in the Betker study, while less radical than some
of the other numbers, are still substantial. Regarding the methodology,
Betker calculated the payments to new bank debt at face value where mar-
ket value was not unascertainable, which in part explains the relatively
inflated estimates of firm value that negatively affect the deviation
figures.4' Betker finds a negative correlation between APR deviation in
favor of equity and the degree of a firm's insolvency. He also observes a
decrease in equity's share as the proportion of claims held by secured
34. Allen C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority
Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990).
35. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in
the Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 143 (1990)
(finding a range in payout from $400,000 to $63 million).
36. Professor White finds, however, that equity's share increases at a slower rate than
creditor's recovery. See Michelle J. White, Survey Evidence on Business Bankruptcy, in COR-
PORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 298, 305-06 (Jagdeep S.
Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996).
37. See Fabozzi, supra note 26.
38. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 35, at 142 (charting the recovery for equity in the
Wickes, Inc. bankruptcy).
39. Id. at 178-79.
40. Betker, supra note 9.
41. Id. at 165.
42. Id.
43. Indeed, the face value of the new debt is a bulky slice of the corporate pie in Bet-
ker's article, representing, on average, 34.5% of the value of new securities issued by a firm
exiting Chapter 11. See id. at 164 n.3.
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creditors and large financial institutions increases, suggesting that so-
phisticated lenders possess leverage in negotiating with management and
equity.44
B. Doctrinal Considerations
Numerous provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the Code) oper-
ate to equity's (and management's) advantage and "stack the deck"
against debtholders and other creditors in the plan negotiations. In many
of its provisions, Chapter 11 protects management and leaves intact the
agency problems discussed supra. Essentially, the Code constitutes a set
of mandatory contractual terms for debt contracts in cases of financial
distress where firms declare for Chapter 11. Voluntary filings by man-
agement commence the vast majority of bankruptcy cases in the United
States; 45 therefore, management usually controls these contractual terms
and whether they will be imposed on creditors." The net effect of the
pro-equity elements of U.S. bankruptcy law is to allow equity and man-
agement to engage in opportunistic behavior by shifting uncompensated
risk and costs onto creditors in the hope of extracting concessions from
creditors during plan negotiations. The putative justifications for such a
system will be examined later, but this Part aims only to elucidate some
of the structures of the Code that operate to the clear advantage of equity
and management.
1. The Debtor in Possession and the Difficulty
of Appointing a Trustee
First, under section 1104(a), the trustee appointment provision,
management usually remains in charge of a Chapter 11 firm as a
"debtor-in-possession ' 47 or DIP. Management, acting as DIP, remains in
control of the assets of the bankrupt firm unless the bankruptcy court
determines appointment of a trustee is appropriate.48 A bankruptcy court
44. Id. at 166-67, 177, 181-82.
45. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS: TEXTS CASES AND PROBLEMS 476 (2001) (noting inter alia that the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts ceased to report the relative proportion of voluntary and involuntary
petitions in the mid-1980s because involuntary petitions were so rare).
46. For a discussion of mandatory contract rules in the context of Chapter 11, see
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Insolvency, 71 TEXAS
L. REV. 51, 61-64 (1992). The mandatory contract rule could also be thought of as an option
exercisable at the sole discretion of management. In this vein, the mandatory contract rules
can be compared to a large amount of warrants outstanding, or even a poison pill. Manage-
ment can threaten to dilute the creditors' share of corporate value by exercising its right to file
for Chapter II and run up costs on the creditors.
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2005).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)-(2) (2005).
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may, upon request, order the appointment of a trustee "for cause, includ-
ing fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the
affairs of the debtor by current management ... or ... if such appoint-
ment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and
other interests of the estate. 4 9 The first clause of the trustee appointment
provision has, not surprisingly, received far more attention in the case
reports. By flagging certain recognizable legal causes of action, the Code
focuses the court's inquiry on the familiar territory of legal-and not
economic-concepts. The difficulty of applying legalistic structures to
the agency conflict is that judges are handcuffed by burdens of proof,
fact sensitive determinations, unavailability of evidence, and generally
stringent substantive requirements.0 Moreover, the qualification of
"gross" mismanagement in the list of causes implies that courts and
creditors must tolerate a degree of (not quite gross) mismanagement.5'
The second prong of Section 1104(a)-the "best interests" test-
may seem at first blush more amenable to creditors seeking to remove
incumbent management. A close reading, however, reveals that appoint-
ing a trustee under the best interest test requires that the appointment be
in the favor of nearly all corporate constituencies .52 When management is
going to bat for equityholders, it is implausible (and, to bring the discus-
sion from theory to practice, vanishingly rare) that a court would appoint
a trustee over equity's objection under the "best interests" test.53
The practical consequence of the stringent requirements for trustee
appointment is a strong presumption in favor of management's continued
control over corporate assets and decisionmaking. Courts have held that
trustee appointment is an extraordinary remedy,4 and empirical studies
predictably reveal the rareness with which such appointments occur.55
49. Id.
50. The games management play with an insolvent firm do not approach the level of
fraudulent misconduct. Though asset substitution games, like fraud, have undeniable alloca-
tive effects, those effects are not in any sense legally culpable on any fraud theory. As long as
managers refrain from self-dealing and outright fraud, trustee appointment is unlikely.
51. COLLER ON BANKR. (Lawrence P. King ed., 2002).
52. The "and" in the clause makes the language conjunctive and requires that creditors,
equity, and "other interests" agree that the trustee would benefit their individual interests. See
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
53. But see In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 474-75 (3d Cir.
1998); see also In re U.S. Mineral Products, Co., 2004 WL 1758499, at *2 (3d Cir. 2004)
(affirming bankruptcy court's authority to order trustee appointment sua sponte and citing 11
U.S.C. §105 for the proposition that failure of a party in interest to move for trustee appoint-
ment will not preclude action by the court).
54. See, e.g., In re Sovereign Estates, Ltd., 104 B.R. 702 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re
William A. Smith Constr. Co., Inc., 77 B.R. 124 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
55. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 699 (explaining study in which only 2 out
of 43-or 5%--large Chapter 11 cases appointed trustees).
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2. The DIP's Exclusive Right to Propose Plan of Reorganization
In addition, the DIP possesses a 120-day window of exclusivity to
propose a plan.56 This period of exclusivity extends to 180 days if the
DIP exercises its exclusive proposal right within the first 120 days.57
Therefore, creditors must either wait out the 180 days (and likely watch
corporate value melt away like an "ice-cream pie"") or show themselves
to be willing to put retained equity securities on the bargaining table.
The situation is most dire for holders of unsecured debt securities. For
these investors, the DIP can postpone interest payments on the claim59
until a reorganization plan is approved. 60 Since managers know creditors
want a quick resolution of the reorganization proceedings, they may
threaten unfavorable terms to some debt claimholders if those claim-
holders do not agree to concessions and impairment of their rights under
the APR.
3. Continued Control over Operation and Business Decisions
Perhaps management's most powerful weapon to wield on equity's
behalf is operational decision-making authority. Managers, acting as the
DIP, retain their authority to bind the company to a course of action or
investment, provided such transactions are conducted "in the ordinary
course of business. 6' If a creditor or (in the case management is creditor-
friendly) a shareholder objects as to the appropriateness of the transac-
tion and the transaction is out of the "ordinary course of business," that
objecting party has the right to "notice and a hearing., 62
Current doctrine prescribes a bipartite test, consisting of "horizontal"
and "vertical" components, to determine the ordinariness of a business
transaction. The "horizontal" test determines whether the contemplated
transaction is of the sort commonly undertaken by firms in the debtor's
industry. The "vertical" dimension is more interesting for our purposes,
as it highlights the risk and return interplay that forms the basis of the
56. See I 1 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2005).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2005).
58. AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COM-
PETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 45, 286 (1991) (analogizing the
bargaining process to a group of children positioning to secure for themselves the largest piece
of a steadily melting ice-cream pie).
59. "Claim" is used instead of "debt" or "amount owed" because creditors are vested
with a bankruptcy "claim" to the estate's assets upon filing a "proof of claim." See 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(a) (West 2005). A "claim" is defined as "a right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment. . . secured, or unsecured" 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West 2005).
60. For unsecured creditors, the claim amount is capped at the amount owed and may
never include "unmatured interest." 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2005).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (2005b).
62. Id.
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agency conflicts. According to the "vertical" test, a court, in determining
whether a creditor is entitled to "notice and a hearing," will consider
whether the transaction subjects the creditor to more risk than the risk
they accepted ex ante and could reasonably expect when they extended
credit.63 If a creditor moves for a hearing under section 363(b), and the
court determines that the transaction would transfer risk onto the creditor
for which the creditor is not compensated, then the bankruptcy court will
grant a hearing to allow the creditor to argue its case. Note also that sec-
tion 363(b) does not prescribe that a judge must enjoin the "unordinary"
transaction; it merely grants an injured creditor the right to voice its con-
cerns in a hearing. Hearings are expensive and unpredictable. Creditors
will usually forego a section 363(b) hearing and avoid the costs. Again,
the presumption in favor of debtor control of assets reduces creditors'
leverage in Chapter 11 negotiations.
Though other parties may certainly propose business suggestions,
only the DIP has the authority to bind the debtor, and therefore it exer-
cises an ultimate veto on any proposed courses of action. As a general
matter, courts have interpreted "the course of business" under section
363(b) broadly and have been reluctant to intrude on management's
"business judgment."6
4. Information Asymmetry and Thorny Valuation Problems
A final matter merits attention: information asymmetry. In Chapter
11, the equity holders, creditors, and other stakeholders are essentially
attempting to value the firm through negotiating alternative plans; 6 at the
conclusion of the negotiation process, securities will be distributed for
the new firm according to the results of the negotiations. The Code dic-
tates the parameters within which the bargaining occurs. The relative
63. See In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. 1992); Burlington North-
em R.R. Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc., (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.) 853 F.2d 700, 705-06 (9th
Cir. 1988); Chaney v. Official Comm. of Unsec. Cred. (In re Crystal Apparel, Inc.), 207 B.R.
406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. James A. Phillips, Inc., (In re
James A. Phillips, Inc.), 29 B.R. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The touchstone of 'ordinariness'
is thus the interested parties' reasonable expectations of what transactions the debtor in pos-
session is likely to enter in the course of its business."); Committee Of Asbestos-Related
Litigants v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Mansville Corp.), 60 B.R. 612, 616-18 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986); Indian Motorcycle Assoc., Inc., (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.),
157 B.R. 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, The
Meaning of "Ordinary Course of Business" Under the Bankruptcy Code-Vertical and Hori-
zontal Analysis, 19 UCC L.J. 364 (1987).
64. See Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc., (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 B.R. 169, 174 (N.D.
Ga. 1983) (expounding a presumption of ordinariness arising from the belief that current man-
agement is best suited to orchestrate a debtor's business rehabilitation).
65. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARV. L. REV. 775, 779-80 (1988).
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availability of information necessarily affects the negotiating posture of
interest holders in a Chapter 11 proceeding, and the effective disclosure
of information is pivotal to the negotiation process. 66 Due to the struc-
tural information asymmetry inherent in a debtor-controlled estate,
creditors can find themselves without the necessary data respecting asset
valuation and possible alternative business plans, materially weakening
their negotiating position.67
Most plans result in unanimous approval by the interest and claims
holders, though a "cram down"-in which a plan is approved without
unanimous approval-is always available, and its shadow overhangs the
bargainingi8 A plan proponent may cram down a plan only if the pro-
posed plan respects the APR.69 Even after equity's 180-day exclusivity
period expires, equity may--especially if its option is barely out-of-the-
money and its request is more likely to elucidate the rights of the par-
ties °-request a valuation of the firm, which requires an expensive
estimation of future earnings." The mere prospect of such a valuation
makes creditors willing to voluntarily impair their legal entitlements to
purchase equity's acquiescence.
As a result, plans are usually consensual agreements among the ne-
gotiating parties, with one caveat: the information asymmetry cuts
decidedly in favor of management. The Code is parsimonious in its ef-
forts to bridge the information gap, requiring only that the DIP provide
"adequate information" 72 to each "holder of a claim or interest" before
66. See Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362 (3d
Cir. 1996) ("[The] disclosure requirements are crucial to the effective functioning of the fed-
eral bankruptcy system. Because creditors and the bankruptcy court rely heavily on the
debtor's disclosure statement in determining whether to approve a proposed reorganization
plan, the importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be overstated.").
67. Cf. Eberhart, supra note 34, at 1459.
68. The "cram down" requires a yes vote from a double majority (one-half of claim-
ants, representing at least two-thirds the value of the total claims) of each class of creditors.
69. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(1)-(2) (West 2005). A plan may be "crammed down the
throat" (as the not-too elegant trade metaphor has it) of dissenting creditors provided it is "fair
and equitable," which requires that "the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim
or interest any property." Id.
70. See Betker, supra note 9, at 166-67.
71. Of course, this expense (like all administrative expenses) will come out of the credi-
tors' share.
72. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West 2005) defines adequate information as "informa-
tion of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in the light of the
nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and records, that
would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interest of the
relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan, but adequate information need
not include such information about any other possible or proposed plan." (emphasis added).
The House Report makes clear that the determination of what constitutes "adequate informa-
tion" should be made on a "case-by-case" basis. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 226-27 (1977),
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that party may vote on any management reorganization plan.73 The defi-
nition of "adequate information" explicitly disavows any requirement for
management to discuss other possible plans,74 and section 1125(b) em-
powers courts to "approve a disclosure statement without a valuation of
the debtor or an appraisal of the debtor's assets. 75 The requirement gen-
erally has been interpreted restrictively by courts to include little more
than financial statements, which need not meet SEC prospectus stan-
dards.76 Section 1125 preserves the ex ante information asymmetry in
Chapter 11 and thereby further tilts in equity's favor.
By not mandating a more comprehensive disclosure, the Code alle-
viates management of the burden of effectuating expensive valuations
of assets and in effect establishes a presumption that management's
estimates are correct.7' Faced with two expensive alternatives-forcing a
valuation hearing or negotiating based on incomplete informational dis-
closure-creditors lose out again.78
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6185-86. One court compiled the following non-
exhaustive list of 18 factors for evaluating the adequacy of disclosed information under section
1125(b): 1) The circumstances that gave rise to the filing of the bankruptcy petition; 2) A
complete description of the available assets and their value; 3) The anticipated future of the
debtor, with accompanying financial projections; 4) The source of the information provided in
the disclosure statement; 5) The condition and performance of the debtor while in chapter 11;
6) Information regarding claims against the estate, including those allowed, disputed, and
estimated; 7) A liquidation analysis setting forth the estimated return that creditors would
receive under chapter 7; 8) The accounting and valuation methods used to produce the finan-
cial information in the disclosure statement; 9) Information regarding the future management
of the debtor, including the amount of compensation to be paid to any insiders, directors,
and/or officers of the debtor; 10) A summary of the plan of reorganization; 11) An estimate of
all administrative expenses, including attorneys' fees and accountants' fees; 12) The collecti-
bility of any accounts receivable; 13) Any financial information, valuations, or pro forma
projections that would be relevant to creditors' determinations of whether to accept or reject
the plan; 14) Information relevant to the risks being taken by the creditors and interest holders;
15) The actual or projected value that can be obtained from avoidable transfers; 16) The exis-
tence, likelihood, and possible success of non-bankruptcy litigation; 17) The tax consequences
of the plan; 18) The relationship of the debtor with affiliates. In re Oxford Homes, Inc., 204
B.R. 264, 269 n.17 (Bankr. D. Me. 1997).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b).
74. See supra note 56.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) ("Whether a disclosure statement required under subsection (b)
of this section contains adequate information is not governed by any otherwise applicable non-
bankruptcy law, rule, or regulation...."); see also In re A.C. Williams Co., 25 B.R. 173 (N.D.
Ohio 1982).
77. Of course, management's estimates will exhibit systematic optimism. The higher
management can value the firm, the more likely equity holders will be entitled to some resid-
ual value, which translates to more leverage in negotiations.
78. Professor Adler vividly describes Chapter 1 's valuation-through-negotiation sys-
tem as a "war of attrition" in which junior claimants have an unfair advantage. See Adler,
supra note 23, at 447-48.
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5. A Note on the 2005 U.S. Bankruptcy Reform
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, passed by Congress in April 2005, addresses legislative concerns
with putative abuses of the consumer bankruptcy laws. Most of the
changes ushered in by the Act relate to consumer bankruptcy procedures,
most notably the introduction of a "means test" in Chapter 13 cases. 9
Some provisions of the bill, however, affect business reorganizations
under Chapter 11, and the effect of those changes is unclear. Some
changes bear mention in the context of this discussion, as they may very
well alter the power balance between managers and the firm's security
holders.
The most notable change is a restriction in the DIP's ability to pe-
tition the bankruptcy court for extensions of the exclusivity period. As
amended, section 1121 will now limit the maximum duration of the DIP's
exclusivity period to 18 months."' Moreover, the 180-day exclusivity pe-
riod pending consideration of a DIP's proposed plan may not be extended
beyond 20 months.8' Another reform limits the DIP's ability to pay large
retention bonuses to key executives.82 Harvey Miller, the noted bankruptcy
expert and investor, sees in the new legislation an example of "creeping
repeal" of the current U.S. Chapter 11 framework.83 Miller and others fore-
see a shift toward a more creditor-oriented system, but for reasons
discussed below, any movement in that direction should be gradual and
take into account the important role bankruptcy laws play in affecting
managers' pre-filing decision making.
C. Normative Implications
The routine deviations from absolute priority in favor of equity and
the retention of management have been heartily condemned by financial
economists and legal scholars alike.84 Some argue instead for a market-
based, automated insolvency regime.85 Others advocate a contractualist
approach, wherein creditors and debtors are able to choose different con-
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). For a discussion of the policy debates surrounding the
"means test," see LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supra note 45, at 455-66.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A).
81. Id. at § 1121(d)(2)(B).
82. Id.
83. Dan Roberts, Bankruptcy Deadline May Focus Minds, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, at 27.
84. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3; Adler, supra note 23; William H. Meckling, Finan-
cial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 L. & CONTEM. PROB. 13
(1977).
85. See Bebchuk, supra note 65; Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for
Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983); Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1085 (1992); Barry E.
Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343 (1997).
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tractual arrangements to guide the debtor through reorganization or liq-
uidation should financial distress befall the firm.86 The contractualists
rely on the Coasian notion that with well-defined property rights and
without transaction costs, private contract negotiating (and renegotiating)
will ensure an ex post efficient outcome.
If Chapter 11-with its inefficiencies relating to management con-
trol and APR deviations-is to survive these critiques, it is in need of a
justification. Some justify retaining and empowering management, de-
spite the attendant agency costs, on the grounds that the efficiency-based
critiques are wrong to blithely assume that the costs of financial distress
can be efficiently allocated by markets or ex ante contracting."
Others emphasize the collective nature of bankruptcy and the desir-
able goal of providing an efficient method of realizing assets' value and
distributing that value to the creditors. These theorists, led by Professor
Thomas Jackson, hypothesize a "creditors' bargain" in which creditors
agree to tie themselves to the mast of Chapter 1 1 in order to obviate the
need to contract for every contingency.8 In this view, bankruptcy should
respect non-bankruptcy entitlements except to the extent necessary to
reduce the collective action problems the system was designed to re-
solve. Mandated bankruptcy sharing of risks and control is the
preferable alternative to (1) a creditors' rush to dismantle the debtor un-
der state law collection procedures or (2) endless proliferation of costly
contracts sharing the risks ex ante.89 Most relevant for the purposes of the
current discussion on agency costs, it also provides for a limited interest
86. See Rasmussen, supra note 46; Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed,
109 YALE L.J. 343 (1999).
87. Professor Elizabeth Warren is concerned with the reductionism that advocates
wholesale repudiation of Chapter 11 because it is perhaps inefficient in achieving one of its
many goals. She warns that "changes pursued for one end may simultaneously move the sys-
tem further away from a number of other objectives." Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 387 (1993) [hereinafter Imperfect
World]. Warren also stresses the dearth of reliable empirical data about the operation of incen-
tives at work for competing parties, especially in routine cases. See generally Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987). Even if lawmakers and scholars
could agree on the goals of the system (for Warren, the chief-and sometimes competing-
goals include the preservation of value for failing businesses, distributing that value according
to efficient and sensible policies, internalizing the costs of business failure, and ensuring that
the system provides sufficient incentives for debtors to choose bankruptcy voluntarily thus
obviating government monitoring), the best rules through which lawmakers or private con-
tracting parties pursue those goals are by no means obvious. Imperfect World, supra, at 387.
88. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986);
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharing and the Creditors'Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989); Thomas H. Jackson, Bank-
ruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
89. Note that such "perfect contracting" is impossible. Professors Baird and Rasmussen
contend that such contracting is fast becoming the norm. Unfortunately, they do not point out
how creditors have managed to contract around agency problems.
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for equity by strengthening management's hand in Chapter 11. By allow-
ing the DIP to maintain control of the ship while it navigates choppy
waters, the Code grants management an interest in the enterprise and
mutes the incentive to gamble or abandon it.9°
Limiting the enforceability of bargained-for contracts in the bank-
ruptcy context (i.e., deviating from the APR in favor of equity) can be
seen as a tax on the contracting parties.9' Debtors have a higher cost of
capital because creditors cannot rely on their contractual entitlements in
cases of financial distress, and everyone suffers from a dead weight loss
of foregone efficient debt contracts. The levying of the tax may be justi-
fied, though, if the costs of planning for financial distress ex ante would
be even higher.92 Put another way, it may be ex ante inefficient to write
down creditors' claims in favor of shareholders, but it could be ex post
efficient, in that it provides managers and equity holders with the right
incentives to maximize firm value once in bankruptcy.93
There are examples of ex ante efficiency gains too.94 The most im-
portant ex ante efficiency enhancement is the incentive provided by
continued debtor control and APR violations for managers to declare
bankruptcy in the first place. Management desires to remain in place,
and equity wants to encourage management to extract some value on
equity's behalf. To the extent distributing value and control to managers
and shareholders assuages the pain of bankruptcy, those parties will be
less inclined to disguise financial distress costs and more inclined to file
for bankruptcy at the right time.9' Encouraging the optimal timing of a
90. See Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy,
Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219 (1989) (summarizing, but disagreeing with, the
Jackson and Scott article); Daigle & Maloney, supra note 9.
91. Jackson & Scott, supra note 88, at 202.
92. Jackson and Scott write: "We have suggested that the distributional effects of bank-
ruptcy are a bankruptcy tax imposed on the participants in the collective proceeding. To the
extent that the tax revenues are used to support the welfare of the claimants as a group, one
can visualize the parties agreeing to so burden themselves in an ex ante bargain." Id. at 203-
04.
93. See David C. Smith & Per Strtmberg, Maximizing the Value of Distressed Assets:
Bankruptcy Law and the Efficient Reorganization of Firms, in SYSTEMATIC FINANCIAL Dis-
TRESS: RESOLUTrIoN AND CONTAINMENT (Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2003).
94. See Clas Wihlborg & Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Infrastructure Requirements in
the Area of Bankruptcy Law (2001) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Wharton
School Financial Institutions Center), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/
papers/01/0109.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
95. The positive ex ante effects should be clear from the above discussion. Professor
Bebchuk, however, is right to point out the potential negative effect of attenuating the discipli-
nary role of debt. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in
Bankruptcy, 57 J. FIN. 445 (2002). Admittedly, some managers may be tempted to take on
risky projects, secure in the knowledge that no one will be completely shut out of the bargain-
ing process if APR is not respected. I presume, however, these inefficient decisions are
substantially outweighed by the efficiency benefits resulting from timely filings. Managers are
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bankruptcy filing is one of the major justifications of Chapter 11 and one
that will be taken up again in the discussion of French bankruptcy to fol-
low. The "bankruptcy tax," in this way, operates as a control on negative
externalities relating to management incentives as to filing decisions.
Moreover, the tax (like a government tax raised to support a public good,
such as national defense) may solve creditors' collective action problem.
Encouraging debtors to petition bankruptcy courts at the right time is a
crucial element of any insolvency system and one that the French sys-
tem, as we will see below, addresses inadequately.
Professor Jackson's theory highlights the conflicting goals of bank-
ruptcy. Chapter 11 is imperfect, but it does not follow, as Professor
Warren has pointed out, that any attempt to balance the competing values
of bankruptcy law is pointless. Though Chapter 11 does preserve many
of the agency costs that exist outside of bankruptcy, it also provides effi-
cient solutions to other problems inherent in the insolvency dilemma.
As a final note, a recent series of articles by Professors Rasmussen,
Baird, and Skeel challenge the underlying logic of much of the bank-
ruptcy literature of the 1980s and 1990s. 96 According to Baird and
Rasmussen, increasingly complex debt contracts that allocate control
rights ex ante,97 a deemphasis of firm-specific specialized assets, and a
developed capital market for distressed firms have fundamentally altered
the Chapter 11 landscape. The intangible assets in today's economy-
because of their increasing liquidity and fungibility-only have value if
a company is doing well and are not worth protecting otherwise. In es-
sence, they argue that the idea of going concern is anachronistic. They
argue further that bankruptcy theory and practice is returning to Ronald
Coase's insight that assets should only be located in a given firm if they
are most valuable in that firm.9 If assets are no longer firm-specific, it
not likely to succumb to equity's pressures to take on risky projects because of management's
lack of diversification and its disproportionate concern with the possibility of financial ruin.
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 9. As discussed supra, managers' caution melts away as the
heat of financial distress turms up, and incentives to bet the ranch can appear inevitable. See
generally sources cited supra note 9.
96. See Robert K. Rasmussen & Douglas G. Baird, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 751 (2002) [hereinafter End]; Robert K. Rasmussen & Douglas G. Baird, Chapter 11 at
Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2004) [hereinafter Twilight]; Skeel, supra note 9.
97. The authors believe that sensible allocations of rights are available that ensure "the
shutdown decision will reside in the hands of those with the best information and the appro-
priate incentives to exercise it correctly." End, supra note 96, at 778. This actor is the residual
stakeholder (usually the senior lender who will not be compensated in full) who stands to reap
the marginal dollar of gain or suffer the marginal dollar of loss from the firm's activities. Id. at
785. Professor LoPucki thinks such a contract is only a theoretical possibility and questions
Baird and Rasmussen's confidence that significant progress has been made in this regard. See
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen's
The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645, 662-63 (2004).
98. End, supra note 96, at 757-58.
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follows that Chapter 11 should not protect them but should instead help
transfer them to a different firm. Rasmussen and Baird claim that Chap-
ter 11 now serves primarily as little more than an auction block where
buyers purchase control of assets in prearranged deals.99
Skeel finds an emerging pro-creditor thrust to Chapter 11 and a
movement away from stakeholder negotiations and towards asset sales
and claims trading for corporate control.' °° The emergence of DIP financ-
ing, Skeel argues, transfers control from management to the postpetition
lender.'0 ' In addition to the new focus on DIP financing, creditors often
offer management "pay for performance" bonuses tied to the expeditious
resolution of the Chapter 11 proceeding.' 2 Recent cases such as World-
Com, Enron, Global Crossing, and Adelphia "powerfully reinforce the
norm of directorial responsiveness to creditors, and particularly to credi-
tors' calls for [management] to step down."103
Both articles highlight a trend away from stakeholder negotiations
and towards more creditor control and more liquid distressed debt mar-
kets.' °M As time goes on, we can only hope that creditors will invent
modes of contracting in such a way to minimize the costs associated
with the agency conflict and to expedite the restructuring. A number of
problems, however, some empirical and others theoretical, remain unan-
swered by these recent articles.
First, many of the recent publicized Chapter 11 bankruptcies were
steeped in fraud, sometimes at the highest levels of management. In such
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that management had little leverage
and that creditors largely ran the show. Indeed, Skeel admits that in these
bankruptcies, "the creditors' threat to call to appoint a trustee [was] far
more potent."'0 5 Second, no empirical data from recent years suggests a
significantly diminished place for equity and management at the negoti-
99. According to Baird and Rasmussen, more than half of large, publicly traded firms
currently entering Chapter 11 undergo section 363(b) sales that result in a transfer of control
of the firm. Twilight, supra note 96, at 675.
100. Skeel, supra note 9, at 918-19.
101. Id. at 923-26.
102. Id. at 926-30.
103. Id. at 932.
104. For a brief summary of the ascendancy in importance of distressed debt financing in
recent years, consult Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 153, 181-82 (2004); see also Dan Roberts, Floodgates Open To a New Style, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at B 1. For an interesting recent example, consider the zeal with which
hedge funds are currently gobbling up stakes of Delphi Corp., which filed in Chapter 11 on
Oct. 8, 2005. See Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Bernard Simon, Hedge Fund Buys 9% Stake in
Delphi, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at 17.
105. Skeel, supra note 9, at 932.
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ating table.' 6 Third, some of the stratagems mentioned by Skeel have the
same effects as APR deviations. For example, "pay-for-performance"
bonuses are boons to incumbent management who, after guiding the firm
into bankruptcy, will now receive compensation for guiding the firm out.
These bonuses transfer value to management and decrease, relative to
prebankruptcy entitlements, the creditors' return. Also, DIP financing
itself is a Code-sanctioned APR violation and would produce many of
the same negative reverberations in the debt market as APR deviations in
equity's favor do. For purposes of the agency cost discussion, it matters
little what form the deviations from absolute priority take; they are all, in
some sense, a bankruptcy "tax," and what matters is that value is being
transferred in violation of prebankruptcy contractual entitlements in or-
der to more properly realign managerial incentives. One instructive
example is Delphi, the auto parts manufacturer, where an estimated $87
million in new bonuses-as well as 10 percent of equity in the new
company-is supposedly on the table for current management. 07 More
empirical research is needed before we can hazard that one APR viola-
tion is preferable to another.
Large firms are still filing for Chapter 11, and management often re-
mains at the helm. LoPucki's rejoinder to Baird and Rasmussen finds that
contrary to the latter's theory, empirical data testify to a robust docket of
large Chapter 11 reorganizations.'O° One need only look to the airline in-
dustry, which has resisted calls for consolidation and liquidation and
maintained separate operations in Chapter 11.1 ' Major airline carriers did
not file pursuant to a prepackaged change in ownership but acted to pro-
tect against creditors, restructure their contracts and leases, and obtain
labor concessions-in short, to participate in a traditional Chapter 11 ne-
gotiation in order to preserve their valuable network of nationwide
routes. "0 Delphi filed for Chapter 11 protection in October 2005, seeking
106. See LoPucki, supra note 97, at 646 (pointing out inter alia the empirical deficiency
of the Rasmussen/Baird article).
107. See John Gapper, The Danger of Rewriting Chapter 11, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005,
at 13.
108. LoPucki, supra note 97, at 647-48.
109. See Caroline Daniel, Chapter 11: A Failsafe For Bad Managers?, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2005, at 5 (reporting on U.S. airlines in Chapter 11 as well as the tendency of foreign
jurisdictions to move closer to the U.S. Chapter 11 corporate reorganization model).
110. On Sep. 14, 2005, both Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines filed for Chapter 11
protection. Northwest recently has taken advantage of Chapter 11 to cancel some aircraft
leases and terminate or phase out relationships with its unprofitable regional partners. See
Northwest Cuts Back Service, available at http://biz.yahoo.com/bizj/050926/
1169447.html?.v=1 (last visited Sep. 29, 2005). UAL, too, has been operating in Chapter II
for three years. On April 9, 2005, United petitioned the bankruptcy court for-and received-
a 60-day extension of the exclusivity period in order to "enable United to continue its hard
work and implement many of its restructuring initiatives." UAL Asks for Delay on Bankruptcy
Michigan Journal of International Law
to renegotiate contracts and labor agreements and to jettison some less
profitable divisions."' Delphi's bankruptcy is the largest industrial bank-
ruptcy ever filed. Though the airlines have justifiably received the most
press attention in recent months, a robust bankruptcy docket can be ob-
served throughout various industries, testifying to the continued
importance of Chapter 11 restructuring in the U.S. corporate community."
2
Because it retains management and fosters private negotiations to
determine a firm's future, Chapter 11 is still the most debtor-friendly
insolvency regime in the world."3 It continues to pursue the goal of en-
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, at 23. The desirability vel non of airlines taking advantage of
Chapter 11 protection is a hotly debated question and one that is outside the scope of this
Note. The frequency of airline bankruptcy, however, does testify to the continuing robustness
of Chapter 11 restructurings.
111. See James Mackintosh, Dan Roberts & Bernard Simon, Delphi Chief Warns of
Hard Choices Ahead, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at 1.
112. Heating Oil Partners, one of the largest distributors of heating oil in the United
States, filed for bankruptcy recently, seeking protection from the 2005 spike in fuel costs.
Heating Oil Partners LP Files for Bankruptcy-Court Protection, Sep. 26, 2005, available at
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/news/article.jsp?content=b092643A#&page=2 (last visisted
Sep. 29, 2005). ThermoView, a company that designs, manufactures, markets, and installs re-
placement windows and doors, filed for Chapter 11 protection to alter its capital structure and
plans on continuing operations. Brent Adams, ThermoView Files For Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Protection, BUSINESS FIRST OF LOUISVILLE, Sep. 26, 2005, available at
http:llwww.bizjoumals.com/louisville/stories2005/0926/daily 1l.html?page=l (last visited Sep.
29, 2005). As a final example, consider the bicycle manufacturer Huffy, whose Chapter 11 plan
was recently approved by a bankruptcy court after a successful restructuring.
113. To illustrate the pro-debtor thrust to Chapter 11 in a slightly different tone, consider
the following tale, reproduced by Insol International:
A businessman was in a great deal of trouble. His business was failing, he had put
everything he had into the business, he owed everybody-it was so bad he was even
contemplating suicide. As a last resort he went to a priest and poured out his story
of tears and woe.
When he had finished, the priest said: "Here's what I want you to do: Put a beach
chair and your Bible in your car and drive down to the beach. Take the beach chair
and the Bible to the water's edge, sit down in the beach chair, and put the Bible in
your lap. Open the Bible; the wind will rifle the pages, but finally the open Bible
will come to rest on a page. Look down at the page and read the first thing you see.
That will be your answer, that will tell you what to do."
A year later the businessman went back to the priest and brought his wife and chil-
dren with him. The man was in a new custom-tailored suit, his wife in a mink coat,
the children shining. The businessman pulled an envelope stuffed with money out
of his pocket, gave it to the priest as a donation in thanks for his advice.
The priest recognized the benefactor, and was curious. "You did as I suggested?" he
asked.
"Absolutely:' replied the businessman.
"You went to the beach?"
"Absolutely."
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couraging management to preserve going concern value and to file for
bankruptcy at the right time and not a la fran~aise, i.e., only when it is
too late.
V. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH: LOOKING TO THE
FRENCH LAW MODEL
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and
Robert Vishny (hereinafter LLSV) have documented relationships
among states' financial laws and their legal origin. In their seminal law
and finance article of 1998, these authors created an index to measure
the quality of investor protection in various states and then analyzed the
index data across states." 4 The study found correlations between, on the
one hand, corporate ownership and investor protection and, on the other,
the respective origins of the legal system. In particular, the studies found
dramatic differences between legal systems which evolved from the
French civil law model and the Anglo-American common law model."5
"You sat in the chair with the Bible in your lap?"
"Absolutely."
"You let the pages rifle until they stopped?"
"Absolutely."
"And what were the first words you saw?"
"Chapter I L."
INSOL INTERNATIONAL, DIRECTORS IN THE TWILIGHT ZONE 423-24 (2001).
114. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); see also La
Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 474 (1999).
115. But see Daniel Berkowitz, Katherine Pistor & Jean-Frangois Richard, Economic De-
velopment, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EuR. EON. REV. 165 (2003); Naomi
Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Business's Organizational Choice: A
Comparison of France and the United States (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10288, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=499313 (last
visited Jan. 16, 2006). Professors Lamoreaux and Rosenthal's findings paint a different picture:
namely, that the broad generalization equating French civil law with higher transaction costs is
misguided because it fails to account for the actual historical development of French civil law.
Their findings suggest to the contrary that French law offered more organizational forms and
flexible contract options than Anglo-American law, which was less responsive to the needs of
business community. The Anglo-American common law caught up to French civil law in terms
of efficient contract law only in the late twentieth century. In the "Transplant Effect" article,
Professors Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard undercut a different contention underlying the LLSV
research. Their article claims that the method by which legal systems are "transplanted" into
developing states matters more than the provenance of the legal system. For these authors, the
process of implementing (or "transplanting") legal rules to govern financial institutions is more
determinative of the effectiveness of legal institutions (or "legality") than what the law actually
is. See Stanislaw Gelfer, Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser, Law and Finance in Transition
Michigan Journal of International Law
States whose financial laws derived from French civil law, in general,
possessed weaker investor protection and higher transaction costs. This
Note takes as a point of departure LLSV's findings of disparities be-
tween French and Anglo-American legal systems, and attempts a
comparative analysis of French and U.S. reorganization law, as well as
the behavioral incentives those laws create. The results of the compari-
son are consistent with LLSV's finding of a French/Anglo-American
disparity and should have important implications for other states whose
legal systems derive from the two models. 6
The French model of corporate insolvency, in contrast to Chapter 11,
shuts equity and management out entirely from the discussion that will
determine a firm's future. From the time a rehabilitation (redressement)
proceeding starts,"7 the court (le tribunal de commerce) and the adminis-
trator are firmly in the driver's seat and in pursuit primarily of statutory
non-efficiency policy goals relating to continued employment. As a re-
sult, the violations from absolute priority in favor of equity are
accidental, if they occur at all. Creditors take no comfort in equity's dis-
advantaged position, though, because their position is equally weak with
respect to the controlling court. Instead of addressing the agency con-
flicts, as Chapter 11 does, by allocating control in the reorganization
framework itself, French law takes a punitive stance, dealing with
agency conflicts through the criminal and civil penalties with less than
encouraging success.
In French bankruptcy, the cardinal concerns are the continued exis-
tence of the firm"8 and the retention of its employees. Agency concerns
Economies (Eur. Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Working Paper No. 49, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=214648 (last visited Jan. 16, 2006). In syn-
thesis, these articles modify the LLSV findings. French law originally was more business-
friendly, and the existing correlation between French civil law and relatively high transaction
costs and weak investor protections may be more a consequence of the transplant effect than any
intrinsic merits of the respective legal systems. Both sets of authors, however, are in agreement
that, broadly speaking, comparing legal systems derived from French civil law to legal systems
derived from Anglo-American common law can yield useful relationships. This Note aims
merely to accentuate the differences in French and U.S. reorganization laws without taking a
position on the broader and interesting questions regarding the historical development of law and
finance and the actual determinants of legality.
116. Looking to the French model is especially useful because of the large number of
states whose bankruptcy laws are based, due to colonization or emulation, on the French
model. See La Porta et al., supra note 114, at 1117-18; see also Berkowitz et al., supra note
115, at 166-67.
117. Under French law, all bankrupts must ask for rehabilitation (redressement) proceed-
ings, and a court will determine whether liquidation or rehabilitation is appropriate. See
discussion infra Part V.A.2.
118. The survival of the firm (or, in the words of the French laws, "la sauvegarde de
l'entreprise") from article L620-1 of the French Code de Commerce is not to be confused with
the preservation of going concern value. Firm survival is often collapsed into the second aim
of French bankruptcy law: the protection of employment ("le mantien de l'emploi"). See, e.g.,
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are subordinated to the greater policy objective of preventing disloca-
tions in the employment market resulting from insolvency. By
addressing the insolvency agency problems through a process largely
exogenous to the bankruptcy proceedings, the French laws create new
opportunities for abuse and may unwittingly subvert their own stated
policy objective of retaining employees. Throughout this discussion, re-
call as counterpoint how Chapter 11 ties the agency solution directly to
the bankruptcy negotiations, in the process muting the agency problems
and temporarily engaging all stakeholders in the negotiation of the firm's
future.
A. The Mechanics of French Bankruptcy Law
French bankruptcy law underwent a dramatic overhaul in the mid-
1980s." 9 The government fixed the contours of the laws in their present
form in 2000, when it promulgated a substantial amendment. 20 Article 1
of the 1985 Law sets the tone of the bankruptcy laws, listing the objec-
tives of French bankruptcy as (1) saving the enterprise, (2) the
121preservation of jobs, and (3) the payment of creditors' claims. Control-
ling interpretations of article 1 dictate that the objectives be taken into
account in descending order of importance. 22 Serious discussions about
reform of the system-and moving it closer to a debtor-centered Chapter
11 model-have been ongoing since 2003, but the new laws have yet to
enter into force.1
2 3
1. Commencing the Case
In France, debtor-initiated filings are mandatory within 15 days of a
debtor's inability to pay its debts as they fall due. 4 French law imposes
draconian liabilities on managers and directors for, among other failures,
Moquet Borde & Associds, Corporate Insolvency Law in France, in EUROPEAN CORPORATE
INSOLVENCY 113, 164-66 (Harry Rajak et al. eds., 1995).
119. Law No. 84-148 of March 1, 1984, effective March 1, 1985; Law Nos. 85-88 and
85-89 of January 25, 1985, effective January 1, 1986, subject to Decree Nos. 85-1388 and 85-
1389 of December 27, 1985 [hereinafter the 1985 Law].
120. A substantial amendment was introduced in 1994 as well. I will refer to the corpus
of French bankruptcy law as the "1985 Law" since that law provided the framework for con-
temporary French bankruptcy law.
121. 1985 Law, supra note 119, art. 1.
122. Richard L. Koral & Marie-Christine Sordino, New Bankruptcy Reorganization Law
in France: Ten. Years Later, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 437, 442 (1996).
123. See discussion infra Part V.C.
124. 1985 Law, supra note 119, art. 3. Managers will be subject to sanctions for failure
to file. Arnold Gewelbe, France, in INT'L CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 177, 183 (Dennis
Campbell ed., 1992). See Judgment of the Cour de Cassation (Commercial Chamber) in
Blanchet contre Cosme Rogeau, in Dalloz Affaires No. 42/1996 (Fr.).
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shirking this duty to file. 25 The condition of insolvency, known as cessa-
tion de paiements,126 is more like the cash-flow test in U.S. law and not a
balance sheet insolvency test.17 Setting the date of cessation de paie-
ments will vary case by case and will establish a frontier after which any
payments will receive heightened scrutiny and potential judicial invalida-
tion. A court may commence proceedings sua sponte as well.' Finally,
creditors may procure a summons for an insolvent debtor by establishing
that the debt is unquestionable, due, enforceable, backed by title, and
uncollectible in previous attempts. 29 When the case commences, a debtor
125. Directors can incur liability pursuant to over 40 provisions in French law. Some
representative examples include the following: "acting for personal gain including a grant of a
pay increase when the company was experiencing great difficulty, failure to keep proper ac-
counts including falsifying or destroying accounting records, not announcing the stopping of
payments on debts, taking actions or making decisions that only could cause the company's
insolvency, and failure to supervise the company's business." Bruce D. Fisher & Frangois
Lenglart, Employee Reductions in Force: A Comparative Study of French and U.S. Legal Pro-
tections for Employees Downsized Out of Their Jobs: A Suggested Alternative to Workforce
Reductions, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'l & COMP. L. REv. 181, 193-94 (2003). Most importantly,
French law allows creditors to collect from the debtor's management in cases of faulty man-
agement. See discussion infra Part V.A.4. Indeed, this tradition of directorial liability in France
is well-established. The previous bankruptcy laws established a rebuttable presumption that
management's malfeasance caused the corporate collapse and that management was liable for
the debts. See Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 202.
126. "Cessation de paiements" is defined as "the impossibility of paying debts due from
available assets." Hubert Lafont, The French Bankruptcy System, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
AND REORGANIZATION PROCEDURES IN OECD AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES 15, 17 (OECD 1994). French bankruptcy courts have developed a jurisprudence of
just what will constitute cessation de paiements, which gives prospective notice to managers
in struggling firms when the game is up. Establishing the date for cessation de paiements is
crucial in a French bankruptcy case, since transactions will be examined and can be declared
void insofar as they affect the firm. Id. Experiencing cash flow difficulties does not always
signal a firm's irreparable insolvency, and French law provides for the appointment of a "me-
diator" (conciliateur) under the Act of 1 March 1984 (adopted in response to the financial
crises of the 1980s and amended by an Act of 10 June 1994) to draft a plan for a firm's return
to viability pending acceptance by the firm and its creditors. Jean-Luc Vallens, The Law in
France: Main Features, in BANKRUPTCY AND JUDICIAL LIQUIDATION 21, 23 (Council of
Europe 1996). Unlike the full-blown bankruptcy proceedings, however, conciliation did not
impose an automatic stay, and it therefore did not provide strong incentives on creditor com-
pliance. Lafont, supra, at 19.
127. See supra note 15; see also INSOL INTERNATIONAL, supra note 113, at 186. Note
that the requirement that all firms voluntarily file within 15 days of cash flow insolvency nec-
essarily means that the scope of the measure is overbroad, and many balance sheet insolvent
firms must file for bankruptcy protection. See Sergio Muro, Deciding on an Efficient Involun-
tary Filing Petition Rule, 31, paper presented March 10, 2005, at the Cornell LL.M. Seminar
Series, available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cornell/lps/papers/6/ (last visited April 14, 2005).
128. The court may also appoint a judge to gather further information regarding the
company before commencement of full-blown proceedings. Such a judge will then prepare a
report, and the court will rule on the report after a hearing where the debtor, a workers' repre-
sentative, and any other party the court deems possesses an interest will attend.
129. Lafont, supra note 126, at 17.
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must submit its financial statements and other disclosures to the court.'3°
The court also imposes a stay on collection efforts. 3'
2. The Observation Period and Administrator Appointment
After the court commences the proceedings, a six-month "observa-
tion period" ensues.3 2 The first order of business is the appointment of
an "administrator."3 3 An additional six-month extension is permitted in
some cases, and the observation period may be terminated at the request
of the administrator, the creditors' representative, the public prosecu-
tor, or the debtor, when the court deems the debtor's rehabilitation
prospects to be nil.
Unlike with the Chapter 11 trustee, the appointment of an adminis-
trator is mandatory, and he or she will guide the debtor through the
reorganization process and, as is most often the case, will put it to rest in
liquidation. The administrator "is primarily concerned with resolving the
economic and employment problems plaguing the enterprise, elaborating
a proposed plan, and managing the debtor's enterprise.' 13' The court re-
tains authority to extend the scope of an administrator's charge. One
duty of an administrator is to prepare a report indicating the origin,
importance, and nature of the debtor's financial distress. The report will
analyze-or, as the statute's language has it, observe-the debtor's pros-
pects for successful rehabilitation. The administrator communicates the
report to the creditors' representative, the debtor, and the workers repre-
sentation committee. 136 The report must contain the administrator's
130. Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 183.
131. Id. at 192.
132. There is a simplified procedure for debtors employing less than 50 persons and an
annual turnover below a threshold amount.
133. In practice, the court will often undertake a viability analysis on its own and appoint
an administrator (instead of a liquidator) only if it appears the firm is capable of rehabilitation.
See Claude Maxime Weil, Bankruptcy and Judicial Liquidation, in BANKRUPTCY AND JUDI-
CIAL LIQUIDATION 41, 43 (1996) (providing a helpful description of the dramatis personae of a
French bankruptcy).
134. The creditors' representative is appointed immediately following the commence-
ment of proceedings. Thus, creditors are not participating directly in the rehabilitation or filing
motions with the court. The creditors' representative will be appointed from a list of certified
liquidators in the region where the proceedings take place. If at any point the court determines
rehabilitation is impracticable or the insolvent firm is not meeting its obligations in the reha-
bilitation phase, the creditors' representative will become the firm's liquidator.
135. Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 184. The administrators are court-appointed from a
nation-wide list of administrators, and are personally liable without limit for any faulty ad-
ministration of the estate. The administrators are, however, required to maintain civil liability
insurance. Lafont, supra note 126, at 18.
136. Appointed in a manner similar to the selection of the creditors' representative, the
workers representation committee reflects the statutory priority accorded to the interests of
labor in the French model.
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analysis of whether rehabilitation is possible.'37 If the court and the ad-
ministrator determine rehabilitation is "manifestly impossible," then the
proceedings will become a liquidation (liquidation judiciaire). If reha-
bilitation is feasible, the administrator's report will include a proposed
plan of rehabilitation (plan de redressement).
Thus, French debtors do not file under a chapter as U.S. debtors do.
The 1994 amendments made access to the rehabilitation function contin-
gent on a court determination that a debtor's emergence from financial
distress is feasible. The standard of proof required to deny access to re-
habilitation protection appears high, but in practice the vast majority of
firms filing for bankruptcy protection in France finish as collections of
liquidated assets; between 90 and 95 percent of French firms filing for
redressement are channeled to liquidation proceedings during this pre-
liminary "observation" period.'38 Seventy percent of these liquidations
occur immediately. 39 Notably, more than 150,000 salaried positions are
lost through liquidation each year.'4° If we assume that the judges are not
liquidating companies arbitrarily (and in violation of the 1985 Law's
mandate, which instructs courts to avoid liquidation unless rehabilitation
137. The law denies access to rehabilitation proceedings when the court determines that
the debtor has (1) stopped making payments, (2) all business activities have ceased, and (3)
rescue is manifestly impossible. In such circumstances, the firm is pushed along into manda-
tory liquidation. See Weijing Wu, Commencement of Bankruptcy Proceedings in China: Key
Issues in the Proposed New Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reorganisation Law, 35 VICT. U. OF
WELLINGTON L. REV. 239, 261-63 (2004).
138. Koral & Sordino, supra note 122, at 448. At present, around 40,000 firms are liqui-
dated each year in converted liquidation judiciaire proceedings. Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer, Reform of French Insolvency Law (June 2004), available at http://www.
freshfields.comlpractice/finance/publications/pdfs/8779.pdf (last visited March 26, 2005)
[hereinafter Freshfields white paper]. Some estimates put the percentage of firms filing for
redressement which end up being liquidated as high as 95%. See e.g., Fdration Bancaire
Franqaise, Sauvegarde des entreprises: mieux associer les creanciers au redressement des
entreprises en difficulti, Nov. 5, 2003, available at http://www.fbf.fr/Web/intemet/content-
presse.nsf/0/7a8e61d51897f3fac 1256dea0052cOab?OpenDocument (last visited March 26,
2005). The article advocates for reversing this trend by encouraging parties to negotiate as
soon as possible: "Pour inverser cette tendance et augmenter les chances de sauvegarde de
l'entreprise, le constat des pouvoirs publics et des professionnels est le m~me: il faut organiser
le cadre contractuel du dialogue entre les entrepreneurs et leurs crdanciers, ds la detection des
difficultrs." Id. Lower estimates hover around 90%. See Anne Salomon, Les Faillites 6t
l'Americaine Arrivent en France, LE FIGARO, Mar. 1, 2005. See also CHRISTINE LEBEL,
L'LABORATION DU PLAN DE CONTINUATION DE L'ENTREPRISE EN REDRESSEMENT JUDI-
ClAIRE 218 (2000); SENATOR JEAN-JACQUES HYEST (OFFICE PARLEMENTAIRE D'tVALUATION
DE LA LGISLATION), RAPPORT SUR LA LIGISLATION APPLICABLE EN MATILRE DE PRVEN-
TION ET DE TRAITEMENT DES DIFFICULT9S DES ENTREPRISES, at 8, available at
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r01I-120/rOl-1201 .pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
139. Id. at 50.
140. Dominique Perben, 160th Session of the Assembl6 Nationale, Mar. 1, 2005, avail-
able at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cri/2004-2005/20050160.asp#P142_32064 (last
visited Apr. 22, 2005).
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is "manifestly impossible" 41 ), the data imply that most companies end-
ing up in redressement proceedings are past the point of no return.
Chapter 11 is by no means an astounding success in this regard, but its
success rate-particularly in larger cases-is significantly higher than its
French counterpart.
42
Moreover, there may be some benefit to entering Chapter 11 even if
liquidation is the end result. If the filing occurred before creditors could
rush to dismantle the debtor, or before the management could siphon off
firm value for its own benefit, then Chapter 11 succeeded in maximizing
creditors' return even despite the liquidation. Because Chapter 11 often
leaves management with a small portion of firm value, it incentivizes
managers to file for protection even if liquidation is inevitable; such an
incentive is notably absent from French bankruptcy law.
What follows is a description of the redressement procedures. It is
necessary to analyze these procedures in light of the reality that success-
ful rehabilitation proceedings are vanishingly rare in France and are the
exception to the rule of liquidation. By understanding the structure of the
rehabilitation law, we can better comprehend how the regime affects
management's ex ante incentives and behavior, as well as how those in-
centives produce so many irremediable bankrupt firms.
3. The Execution Period: Approving and Implementing
Plan of Rehabilitation
Throughout the bankruptcy, the debtor remains nominally in charge
of operational and business affairs. Unlike Chapter 11, though, the
debtor has no direction over the plan of rehabilitation, and even with re-
spect to operations, it is subject to the supervision of the administrator.
In this strict division of competences, the administrator focuses on the
141. See supra note 137.
142. In the 1980s successful reorganizations were rare, though not as rare as in France.
For every year since 1989, however, the rate of confirmation for Chapter 11 plans has ex-
ceeded 25% and now is over 30%. Reauthorization of the U.S. Dept. of Justice: Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys, Civil Division, ELwironment and Natural Resources Division, Execu-
tive Office for U.S. Trustees, and Office of the Solicitor General: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. Of the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 76
(2001) (statement of Martha Davis, Acting Director, Exec. Office for United States Trustees,
U.S. Dept. of Justice). Confirmed plans do not always avoid liquidation because a percentage
of approved plans (around 25%) provide for the firm's liquidation. Even after accounting for
these Chapter 11 liquidation plans, the comparative success of Chapter 11 is striking. The
success rate for larger Chapter 11 plans is higher still. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William
C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum-Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wisc. L. REV. 11, 18, 41 n.105 (finding confirmation rates of
89% to 96% for the largest Chapter II plans filed between 1979 and 1988).
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overarching goals of the bankruptcy regime,'43 and the managers focus
on the firm's commercial activities. Although the debtor will retain title
to its property, its control over the firm's assets varies, as it is subject to
the virtually limitless discretion the court possesses to circumscribe the
debtor's control authority. At a minimum, though, the administrator will
exercise a supervisory role over the firm's direction.' 44
During the execution period, the administrator and the debtor adopt
a plan and put into force. Ultimately, a plan needs court approval in or-
der to obtain legal force. 45 The creditors' representative will receive a
copy of the administrator's report and will send a copy to each creditor
who filed a claim with the court. 14 6 A creditor who fails to respond to the
proposed plan will be deemed to accept it, which (as a practical matter
but not as a legal matter) increases the likelihood the court will approve
the plan.147 If the creditors reject the proposal, the court will specify that
all debts must be paid in full over a time period specified by the court
itself.'4 Once the court approves a plan, it appoints an administrator
(usually the same administrator who guided the plan's formation) to su-
pervise plan implementation and distribute the amounts due to
creditors. 149 The continued operation of the collection stay is contingent
on the debtor's compliance with the rehabilitation plan.5 ° The court re-
tains jurisdiction to rescind the plan ex officio or on motion from any
aggrieved creditor.'
Notably, courts can and do make plan acceptance subject to the re-
placement of one or more members of the debtor's management.'52 The
court may further require that voting rights appurtenant to shares held by
members of management be exercised by a court-appointed attorney.153
Moreover, in all cases management is estopped from transferring shares
in the company. 14 Other cases involve the court ordering management's
divestiture at share prices determined by court-appointed appraisers. '
143. The administrator is, essentially, a functional instrument of the proceedings. The
administrator pursues the stated objectives of the French bankruptcy regime: protecting the
company and its business activities, protecting employment, and clearing the deficit. See Weil,
supra note 133, at 45.
144. See id. at 43; Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 190.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Vallens, supra note 126, at 24.
150. Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 190.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 191.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Because European companies, even more than U.S. companies, have
overinvested management, " ' such restrictions undoubtedly weigh heavily
on the prefiling decisions of French corporate managers. Indeed, because
of the common unity of interest between management and equity in
French corporate structure, the agency problems of debt are more pro-
nounced than in the U.S. system, where management is usually, but not
always, aligned with equity.
57
As for the contents of the plan, the court exercises plenary authority
over the rehabilitation, with no substantive requirements beyond court
approval. Like Chapter 11, a plan need not respect absolutely creditors'
pre-filing entitlements. Any dissenting creditor, however, is entitled to 100
percent fulfillment of its claim, although payment may be extended15 and
post-filing interest stops accruing.'59 So if a creditor voluntarily accepts
less than full satisfaction of its claim, the plan may still proceed, provided
the other creditors' claims are paid in nominal-and not real-amounts
over the course of the plan. Plans may also provide for the sale of assets
or for a complete transfer of ownership. '60 Such plans squeeze out the ex
ante equityholders but retain the firm as a going concern. In the end, the
court's yardstick will be whether "the debtor's financial, economic and
employment situation [are] worthy of rehabilitation.' 6 '
A hypothetical plan in which an administrator proposes 50 percent
payment to accepting creditors over five years, 100 percent payment to
creditors over ten years, and the continued existence of the debtor qua
employer will almost certainly obtain the court's blessing. Though such
a plan may seem perverse to a student or practitioner of Chapter 11, it is
the result of a well-defined policy in favor of firm survival and continued
employment. 62 What remains to be explained, however, is why so few
plans reach completion of the rehabilitation process.
156. The separation of ownership and control, for decades the norm in U.S. capitalism
and documented by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, is still not dominant in many European
markets, where majority shareholders often serve as managers of their firms. See, e.g., Rafael
La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).
157. See supra note 9.
158. The 1994 amendments capped the duration of payment plans, but the payments
may still be spread out over 10 years time. The first payments must begin no later than one
year after plan approval. See 1985 Law, supra note 119, arts. 65, 74.
159. 1985 Law, supra note 119, art. 55.
160. Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 196.
161. Id. Note that the court's willingness to accept a plan will be a function of the pro-
posed plan's relative congruence with the stated goals of the 1985 Law. See generally
discussion infra Part V.A.
162. Some have explained the pro-labor bias of the 1985 Law as a social safety net to
curb the relatively high unemployment rates in France. See Koral & Sordino, supra note 122,
at 444.
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4. Penalties and Sanctions for Managers and Equityholders
The sanctions and liabilities directors incur for directorial malfea-
sance are not, strictly speaking, all part of the bankruptcy regime, though
many apply especially when a firm is insolvent. 163 The sanctions include
criminal, civil, and bankruptcy-related liabilities. These laws are in part
remedial, but their primary focus is deterring management behavior
deemed to be contrary to the interests of the firm, and they are therefore
concerned with an agency problem.' 64
Courts can attach liability to corporate directors and managers of
French socijts t responsabilit limitge or socigt's anonymes for all or
part of an insolvent firm's debts.' 65 A tribunal may initiate this proce-
dure-known as an action en comblement de passif-when the
disposable assets, or actif disponible, are insufficient to cover the firm's
debts. The procedure applies not only to de jure members of manage-
ment but also to shareholders assuming an active role as de facto
managers.'6 Courts also have authority to extend bankruptcy proceed-
ings (and court control) to directors' personal assets in appropriate
circumstances. 1
67
In some situations, civil sanctions may also be appropriate. Personal
bankruptcy (faillite personnelle) may be imposed on the management of
a corporate debtor-again, at the court's discretion-where it is shown
that management concealed or destroyed the accounting books of the
bankrupt firm, embezzled or concealed part of the firm's assets, fraudu-
lently caused the firm to lever up its debt, or failed to declare cessation
de paiements within the required 15-day period. 68 Civil sanctions range
from economic (e.g., forced divestiture) to civil (e.g., the loss of civil
rights including inter alia the right to vote, the right to hold elected of-
163. See generally Moquet Borde & Associds, supra note 118, at 164-66; Anker Soren-
sen & Jane Sandilands, France, in DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY (Anker
Sorensen ed., 1999); France, DROIT ET AFFAIRES, 8-10 (January 1998); MARTINE DIZEL
CHANFREAU, DROIT DE L'ENTREPRISE EN DIFFICULTL, 104-17 (1999).
164. To some degree, the punitive aspects of director liability for insolvency are a vestige
of an older attitude towards defaulting debtors that criminalized bankruptcy law as a moral
fault. As the economic importance of insolvency-as well as the awareness that insolvency
was sometimes an exogenous and inevitable phenomenon-became obvious to lawmakers, the
legal framework changed drastically. Yet some elements of the old regime remain. See PAUL J.
OMAR, EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY LAW 10-11 (2004).
165. 1985 Law, supra note 119, art. 180; Sorensen & Sandilands, supra note 163, at 240;
Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 202.
166. Id. at 204. See, e.g., Judgment of the Cour d'Appel de Paris (May 23, 1997), in La
Semaine Juridique 1997 Ed. E, No. 28-29 (holding parent company liable for subsidiary's
liabilities because the parent's interference with subsidiary's operational freedom rendered it
the manager-in-fact of the subsidiary).
167. 1985 Law, supra note 119, art. 182; Sorensen & Sandilands, supra note 163, at
251-57; Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 204.
168. 1985 Law, supra note 119, arts. 187-91; Gewelbe, supra note 124, at 203.
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fice, and the right to be a member of a jury in criminal proceedings).'69 In
some cases, a criminal court may bring charges against corporate man-
agers if they have committed certain acts detrimental to the creditors. "'
The criminal sanctions are independent of the civil penalties, and both
may be assessed simultaneously."'
The effectiveness of such laws depends on (1) effective enforcement
and (2) ensuring the threatened penalty is directed to the agents whose
behavior is at issue-in this case, the corporate managers. As to en-
forcement, the reform in 1985 ushered in a period of lax enforcement
relative to what had occurred under the earlier 1967 statute.' The abated
enforcement of director liability statutes resulted from modified policy
directives and as one French tribunal commercial judge remarked, "is
actually a rare occurrence today."'7 3 The level of scrutiny is arbitrary,
though the Minister of Justice has instructed public prosecutors to be
diligent in larger cases where the sum of the debts exceeds a certain per-
centage of the company's annual turnover.7 4 The vast majority of the
over 40,000 French bankruptcies, then, lack effective enforcement of
director-liability laws.
The directional issue-who is the ultimate penalty directed
against?-is more complex. Obviously, director-liability laws aim to as-
sess penalties on directors and force them to reconsider unlawful
behavior in light of potential criminal and civil sanctions. The civil sanc-
tions, however, only achieve their goal of disincentivizing managers'
behavior if management is unable to opt out of liability through D&O
liability insurance contracts. Originally considered illegal by many
French courts, which held that state-imposed penalties were uninsurable,
such contracts are widely available today."5 The policies vary, naturally,
and may not cover all possible civil penalties, but the insurability of
some penalties undoubtedly attenuates much of the coercive effect of the
director-liability laws. 176 By spreading the risk among many directors, the
behavior-modifying effect is diluted so as to be purely ineffective. What
169. Id.
170. Id. at 204. Criminal sanctions include potential prison sentences of five to seven
years as well as substantial monetary penalties. Sorensen & Sandilands, supra note 163, at
266.
171. Id.
172. Koral & Sordino, supra note 122, at 440.
173. Id.
174. Sorensen & Sandilands, supra note 163, at 240.
175. Benoit Garrigos, Risques Juridiques des Managers, Quelles Responsabilitds?, (pa-
per presented at Colloquium of Groupe de recherche en Economie et Management des
Organisations, 16-18 (June 18, 2004), available at http://www.esdes-recherche.net/ESDES%
20-%20GEMO%20(F)/docs/PDF/2_4.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2005); see also INSOL INTER-
NATIONAL, supra note 113, at 214.
176. Id. at 18.
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remains, then, is a bundle of "hollow sticks": a limited set of uninsurable
criminal and civil penalties that lack zealous enforcement mechanisms. 17
B. French Bankruptcy Law and Agency Conflicts
I have sketched a rough outline of the French bankruptcy laws and
can now analyze the agency conflicts they create between debtholders
and management. French law differs from Chapter I l's treatment of cor-
porate agents in two dramatic aspects: (1) management and equity are
expelled from the bankrupt firm; and (2) lawmakers have chosen to in-
centivize management by threatening civil and criminal sanctions for
director malfeasance. The net result is that management has no ex ante
incentive to file for redressement protection.
The dramatis personae of redressement proceedings are not the fa-
miliar cast of stakeholders from Chapter 11, since it is the judge and the
administrator-and not the corporate stakeholders-who determine the
form the reorganization will take. The opportunities for management and
equity involvement in these proceedings are virtually nonexistent. The
existence of extensive criminal and civil sanctions for failure to file high-
lights the 1985 Law's anti-management bias; after all, if managers had
sufficient incentive to file timely relief petitions and preserve going con-
cern value, French law would not have to threaten them for not doing so.
As for equity, even if it is able to exert some control over management,
its efforts are unlikely to have any effect on the disposition of the case.
Unlike Chapter 11, there exist very few incentives for managers to file
for bankruptcy protection or to otherwise make value-maximizing deci-
sions and investments when a firm enters financial distress.
177. If French law prohibited the enforceability of insurance contracts dealing with di-
rector liability, it would no doubt increase the efficacy of the "stick" approach. The U.S.
bankruptcy laws prohibit the waiving of certain pro-debtor elements of the reorganization
proceedings. For example, many courts have held that a debtor may not enter into a pre-
petition waiver of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). See Mark F. Hebbeln,
Prepetition Waivers of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: The Economic Case for Nonen-
forcement, 115 BANKING L.J. 126, 126-27 (1998). Another example is the unenforceability of
an ipso facto clause. An ipso facto clause is a "contract clause ... designed to effect a forfei-
ture or modification of the Debtor's rights when a bankruptcy is filed." Michael D. Fielding,
Preventing Voluntary and Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitions by Limited Liability Companies,
18 BANKR. DEV.J. 51, 53 (2001). The U.S. Bankruptcy Code renders such contracts unen-
forceable in five different sections. See id. Just as U.S. law prohibits waiving the "carrot:' it
would appear desirable for French law to prohibit waiving the "stick." A structural problem,
discussed more at length at note 172, supra, would still remain, however. Managers would
have no incentive to maximize firm value beyond avoiding proscribed conduct. Since it is
impossible to prohibit all value-minimizing conduct without unnecessary and significant in-
tmsions on management's ability to run a firm, some degree of malfeasance will always
escape liability.
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The incentives that do exist come from civil and criminal punitive
measures. The French solution to the agency conflicts in insolvency-and
by no means are the French alone in applying this strategy"'-involves
sticks rather than carrots. The problems with such an approach are both
structural and enforcement-related. The structural problem results from the
fact that a manager's incentives in such a regime are to comply with the
laws in order to avoid liability, which is not always in the best interests of
the firm's creditors. If the law-either criminal or civil-could anticipate
all potential instances of managerial abuse, and if there were no eviden-
tiary or enforcement problems, then the French system would put
managers in the best position to timely steer the firm into bankruptcy. We
know, however, that these laws are by their nature crude and underinclu-
sive and that managers will be able to maneuver around the edges of
liability, pursuing their own interests at the expense of the firm's interests.
Punitive laws, in essence, cannot include the universe of possible non-
value maximizing behavior; hence, such laws give managers the green
light to do anything that does not fall within the explicit proscription con-
tained in the law.'79 Management has no incentive whatever to maximize
value in financial distress beyond avoiding types of prohibited conduct.
To illustrate this structural problem, consider that the effectiveness
of the proscription "though shalt not kill" depends in part on its proscrib-
ing a forbidden result that can be achieved in innumerable ways.
Director liability laws, in contrast, proscribe narrow ranges of conduct
with the aim of curtailing a similarly broad phenomenon of "losing other
people's money." Of course, the French could remedy this problem by
adopting the framework of the murder proscription (i.e., an outright ban
on achieving a harmful result). A legal regime which punished managers
for losing money would have the collateral consequence of chilling any
risk-taking behavior. Risky economic decisionmaking-unlike bodily
harm to human beings-is at once desirable and pernicious. Put differ-
ently, no one worries that by prohibiting murder we are actually reducing
the number of non-fatal batteries (indeed, such collateral consequences
may be intended), but it would disturb us greatly if by punishing the unde-
sirable result of poor performance we chilled significantly all economic
178. See generally INSOL INTERNATIONAL, supra note 113.
179. Cf. Myers, supra note 11, at 96. The author, discussing management compensation
schemes that provide incentives for agents to align their interests with principals, stresses the
impossibility of pinpointing criteria which are objective measurements of agents' success:
"Even if good performance on these dimensions were observable by some informed monitor,
the performance would not be verifiable. A contract offering a bonus for, say, 'good decisions'
would not be enforceable, because the decisions could not be evaluated by a disinterested
outsider or by a court of law." Id. Similarly, there is no reason to expect courts of law to evalu-
ate what a bad decision is, and many bad decisions no doubt go unobserved and unverified
under French director liability law.
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risk-taking. The structural problem of sanctions in the context of insol-
vency is that the laws are either too broad, chilling vital risk-taking, or are
too narrowly drawn and fail to deter bad investment decisions.
In addition to the structural problem, we also have seen that the en-
forcement of French director liability laws is weak and that many of the
legal penalties can be insured against. When equity is not acting as man-
agement itself, 80 it can be expected to pressure management to engage in
asset substitution'8 ' in the period leading up to bankruptcy. Equity-to
whom liability is unlikely to attach-will do whatever is in its power,
including higher compensation packages, to avoid turning over the com-
pany to the court. So while equity exerts pressure on management, the
liabilities (the "sticks") French law imposes on directors do not, by and
large, provide a strong incentive for directors to file for redressement
protection.
It is not surprising, in this context, to find a high percentage of bank-
ruptcies being channeled to judicial liquidation instead of
redressement.' 82 The stated goal of firm survival may be subverted by
management's perverse incentives to sail the firm into harm's way rather
than guide the damaged ship into the protective harbor of redressement.
As one French parliamentarian remarked recently, "numerous commen-
tators have noticed that, in most cases, the managers refuse to recognize
their difficulties, even when they are clearly in the cessation de paie-
ments period."'83 Once management can convince itself that it is unlikely
to incur liability, "anything goes." Creditors and employees are left to
suffer the consequences.
The frequency of liquidation impugns the efficacy of the French ap-
proach even more in light of the legal obligation to file for redressement
within 15 days of cessation de paiements, which should mean that many
viable companies with temporary cash flow shortages should be filing!
Remember, after all, that the administrator and the tribunal are statutorily
180. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text. For a colorful anecdote illustrating
the inefficacy of redressement, consider the example of former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raf-
farin's reaction to the restructuring negotiations over the future of the large Alstom group: "I am
confident because we have let the world know that it would be a catastrophe to let Alstom end
up in bankruptcy ["au d~p6t de bilan," or "filing of the balance sheet"]. Alstom has more than
120,000 workers ... [and] formidable human capital, and then also some necessary industrial
centers for transport and energy, not merely for France but for Europe as well." Intervention
sur M6 dans le cadre de l'imission Zone Interdite (Sep. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.archives.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/raffarinversion 1/fr/ie4/contenu/40679.htm.
(last visited March 26, 2005) (translations by author).
183. Janine Jambu, 165th session of the Assembl6 Nationale, Mar. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cri/2004-2005/20050165.pdf (last visited Apr. 22,
2005).
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obligated to avoid liquidation where the bankrupt company's prospects
for rehabilitation are not "manifestly impossible."' Conversely, manag-
ers may avoid the filing requirement altogether by simply maintaining
cash flow solvency but leveraging the company impossibly high. 85
It is not altogether clear whether the French system even protects
employees in the final analysis. Once the court commences redressement
judiciaire, the state is in charge, and it will do everything within its
power to achieve its goal of avoiding job losses. In contrast to Chapter
11, though, the 1985 Law accomplishes nothing in terms of aligning the
debtor's interests with the employees' interests ex ante. By relegating
creditors to the recovery of judgments after bankruptcy and nominal
payments spread out over ten years, the cost of capital for French corpo-
rations no doubt rises, which could stunt economic and employment
growth. But most importantly, the predominance of liquidation bank-
ruptcies testifies to the fact that firms are not successfully reorganizing
and jobs are being lost.
C. Moving Towards Twilight?: Proposed French Reforms
Emulate Chapter 11 Structure
On January 26, 2004, the French Ministry of Justice disclosed its
much-anticipated proposal to overhaul French bankruptcy law (projet de
loi de sauvegarde des enterprises). 8 6 The Council of Ministers adopted
the proposals in May 2004, and the Assembl6e Nationale (lower house
of French parliament) adopted the law on March 9, 2005. The S6nat sub-
sequently adopted the law as well, which was quickly (and
unsuccessfully) challenged in the French Conseil Constitutionnel87 by
Socialist Party senators who complained the law aggregated too much
184. See Wu, supra note 137, at 262, and accompanying text.
185. Calisto Tanzi may have pursued just such a strategy in the global default of Italy's
Parmalat group. By fraudulently concealing the company's true finances, the group was able
to access debt markets and make minimum payments to its obligations, all the while digging
the company into a deeper hole. Admittedly, the Parmalat example involved some egregious
and persistent fraudulent conduct that several criminal and civil penalties address (indeed,
Tanzi will likely spend time in prison). In principle, however, a management could-in the
short term, at least-forestall cash flow insolvency by borrowing more money without engag-
ing in conduct amounting to criminality.
186. Freshfields white paper, supra note 138, at 1.
187. The French Conseil Constitutionnel is a staggered body composed of nine mem-
bers, each appointed for nine years. Every three years, three members are appointed. Former
French presidents are also ex officio members of the Conseil. The Conseil's jurisdiction ex-
tends to constitutional challenges to proposed laws brought by the president, the prime
minister, the presiding member of either house of the legislature, or by application of 60 or
more senators or representatives (of the Assembl6e Nationale).
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power to bank creditors.'88 The proposed reforms would create an addi-
tional procedure similar to Chapter 11: le sauvegarde de l'entreprise.
The sauvegarde alternative is available to managers'89 before the actual
cessation de paiements stage.' 90 A court order would impose a stay on
collection efforts (obviating the major obstacle to negotiations under the
conciliation regime'91) and the firm could commence negotiations with
its creditors. The court supervising the negotiations over the future of a
large firm 92 will appoint two creditors' committees-one representing
credit institutions and another representing trade creditors-that will
vote to accept or reject a proposed plan.' 93 The court, however, may ap-
prove a sauvegarde plan over a committee's dissent.' 94 The introduction
of committees would extend to the redressement proceedings as well.' 95
Most notably, the sauvegarde laws permit management to retain con-
trol over the company and provide for a more limited charge for the
administrator.' 96 In fact, the sauvegarde mimics Chapter I l's exclusivity
188. The case brought by the Socialist senators was decided on July 22, 2005. The
claimants contended that by a certain provision, allowing banks to achieve heightened priority
when introducing new capital to bankrupt firms, the sauvegarde law violated the constitutional
principle of equality. Banks would be permitted certain priority-enhancing actions to the det-
riment of the public-in the form of government creditors, social security investors, and
unemployment insurance companies. Decision No. 2005-522 DC, Loi de sauvegarde des en-
terprises, para. 3 (July 22, 2005). It is worth mentioning in this regard that the disputed
provision is yet another U.S. bankruptcy law analogue. 11 U.S.C. §364(d)(1) allows a debtor
to obtain new credit by offering a senior secured position to a lender. Typically, the only lend-
ers in position to extend such credit are the bank creditors, who are already familiar with the
debtor's business and are often willing to throw new money in the pot to hopefully save their
original investment.
189. The sauvegarde, like Chapter 11, in this way promotes voluntary filings.
190. The other pre-cessation procedure available to French debtors-the conciliation
process-is discussed supra in note 123. The new legislation expands the availability of con-
ciliation even up to 45 days after cessation de paiements. As with the current version,
however, there is no stay of collection imposed. See Law No. 2005-845 of July 26, 2005, J.O.,
July 27, 2005, art. 5 (art. L.611-4 of the Commercial Code) (2005), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.frWAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=JUSX0400017L (last visited
Sep. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Sauvegarde law].
191. See supra notes 123 and 187.
192. Sauvegarde law, supra note 190, art. 83 (art. L.626-29 of the Commercial Code)
("Les d6biteurs dont les comptes one dt6 certifids par un commissaire aux comptes ou dtablis
par un expert-comptable et dont le nombre de salarids ou le chiffre d'affaires sont supdrieurs
des seuils fixds par d6cret en Conseil d'ttat, sont soumis aux dispositions de la pr6sente sec-
tion). The thresholds have not been determined, and will be set by decree in the future. Id.
193. Id. art. 83 (art. L.626-30 of the Commercial Code).
194. Id. arts. 59, 83 (arts. L.626-1 and L. 626-31 of the Commercial Code).
195. Id. art. 88 (art. L.631-1 of the Commercial Code).
196. Id. art. 23 (arts. L.621-4 and L.622-1 of the Commercial Code) ("L'adminstration
de l'entreprise est assurde par son dirigeant."); see also Nouvelles Orientations pour la
Sauvegarde des Entreprises, available at http://www.lawperationnel.com/Sauvegarde/loi-
sauvegardeNouvelles Orientations.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2005) ("Le chef d'entreprise
n'est pas d6poss6d6 durant cette procddure de ses pr6rogatives et l'administrateur nommA ne
peut avoir qu'une mission de surveillance et d'assistance.").
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period by providing a time lag of 30 days prior to the constitution of the
creditors' committees and a two-month time lag before the debtor must
present a plan to the committees.' 9 The legislative history of the pro-
posed reform testifies to debtor control as the driving purpose behind the
legislation. During debate in the National Assembly, Xavier le Roux, a
supporter of the bill, emphasized that under the new law administrators
must respect their limited role and that "the managers maintain the re-
sponsibility for the [distressed] company's direction."'98 The Finance
Commission's rapporteur, Jr6me Chartier, provides in his report that
"the logic of the bill is clear: to leave the managers themselves in charge
of the business, with the administrator having nothing more than a su-
pervisory, or assistant, capacity."'1' The law aims to "responsabiliser" 200
the managers.2 0 ' The report invokes the model of Chapter 11 repeatedly,
as well as its goal--emphasized throughout this Note-of encouraging
timely bankruptcy petitions: "For this reason, it is the manager himself
who can commence, as soon as difficulties appear, the procedures envi-
sioned by the bill., 22 M. Chartier refers to Chapter 11-and le
sauvegarde-as an "anticipated, negotiated, and simplified" redresse-
203
mentjudiciaire.
But if all goes well, the firm will not be forced into redressement and
will be able to reach a compromise with its creditors' committees with-
out too much heavy-handed interference by the administrator. By
preserving management's control, the sauvegarde system grants it a
stake in the firm's future, if it is willing to appease creditors. The goals
of preserving going concern value and efficiently distributing assets (as
well as preserving employment) are synchronized with the goal of reduc-
ing ex ante agency conflicts. Granted, by allowing management to retain
control with a collection stay in place, sauvegarde creates new problems
that are old hat for Chapter 11 (e.g., the costs of management's rent-
seeking once bankruptcy has commenced). Inevitably, creditors of
French bankrupts will invent methods akin to APR violations in order to
purchase management's compliance (e.g., the "tax" discussed at Part
197. Sauvegarde law, supra note 190, art. 83 (art. L.626-30 of the Commercial Code).
198. Xavier le Roux, 168th Session of the French AssemblW Nationale, Mar. 8, 2005,
available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cri/2004-2005/20050168.asp#P491_67301
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
199. Jr6me Chartier, Avis Presents au Nom de la Commission des Finances, de
l'Economie Gdnirale et du Plan sur le Projet de Loi de Sauvegarde des Entreprises, Doc. No.
2099, Feb. 14, 2005, at Part II.A.2, available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/12/rapports/r2099.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2005)
200. See LAROUSSE FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 650 (1981) (defining "responsabi-
liser" as "to make aware of one's responsibilities").
201. Chartier, supra note 199, at Part II.A.
202. Id.
203. Id. at Part l.B.I.
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II.C supra). If the sauvegarde succeeds in reducing the number of liqui-
dations, however, the ex ante efficiency effects regarding the filing
decision are likely to outweigh the new agency problems. The new law
recognizes that creditors (and employees) are better off transferring
some value and control to managers in order to procure their cooperation
than sifting through the slim pickings of a liquidation sale of a depleted
firm.
A final note may be in order regarding where the sauvegarde reform
fits in the historical development of the French bankruptcy law. If, as
discussed above, academics and investors in the United States foresee a
shift, already under way, away from equity and in the direction of en-
hanced creditor involvement in restructurings, it may seem odd to
applaud France's adoption of a Chapter 11-type framework all the while
the United States is jettisoning portions of that very system. Broad cross-
state comparisons of financial and bankruptcy laws, however, can be
misleading. Different states' stages of legal development are rarely in a
tight parallel relationship, and the LLSV findings highlight the particular
dissonance between French and Anglo-American law. It is also helpful in
this regard to refer to the articles by Professors Pistor and Berkowitz ex-
plaining the importance of the "transplant effect" of legal rules,
specifically their observation that the substance of legal rules sometimes
matters less than the process by which those rules are integrated into a
204state's legal system. Moreover, despite the recent overtures to man-
agement and equity, French bankruptcy law will still offer creditors and
courts more discretion over the insolvent company than Chapter 11.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The importance of agency conflicts and agency costs cannot be
overestimated in the insolvency context. We have seen how managers
and equityholders have interests adverse to the interests of creditors dur-
ing times of financial distress and how, by deviating from the absolute
priority rule in favor of equity, creditors can mitigate the conflicts and
obtain both ex ante and ex post efficiency gains. Drawing on the already
ample literature, I have presented an argument that a bankruptcy regime
giving management (and by extension, more often than not, equity) con-
trol over the proceedings is more likely to preserve going concern value.
New critiques that highlight leverage gains by creditors are helpful, but
they do not explain away the agency problem: someone must still be in
charge of the company and that someone is usually management, which
204. See supra note 115.
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will demand payment in some form. Chapter 11 is by no means perfect,
but calls for its wholesale abolition either underestimate the agency con-
flicts of insolvency or overestimate the degree to which private
contracting has rendered those conflicts obsolete.
I then examined the French bankruptcy laws and found that those
laws exacerbated agency conflicts in pursuit of a non-efficiency goal and
attempted to address the agency conflicts outside of bankruptcy negotia-
tions in the form of punitive sanctions. In so doing, the French system
ossifies the conflicts that Chapter 11 aims to mitigate and subverts the
very goals of firm survival and employee retention that the French sys-
tem aims to promote. New French laws do, however, reflect some
insights from Chapter 11 and agency theory and represent a significant
step forward for France. The new sauvegarde procedure follows Chapter
SlI's example of providing ex ante incentives for management to file for
protection and aims to secure more successful rehabilitations-and
fewer liquidations-than the current failed redressement option. The re-
cent overture in the direction of Chapter 11 is a welcome development
for nearly all French commercial parties. The explicit reliance on Chap-
ter 11 as a template for the new sauvegarde procedure recalls the
important incentive structure for agents that lies at the heart of Chapter
11 and that any proposed bankruptcy reform ignores at its peril.

